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[1445] 
Counterfeit Campaign Speech 
REBECCA GREEN† 
We are entering an era in which computers can manufacture highly-sophisticated images, audio, 
and video of people doing and saying things they have, in fact, not done or said. In the context of 
political campaigns, the danger of “counterfeit campaign speech” is existential. Do current laws 
adequately regulate faked candidate speech? Can counter speech effectively neutralize it? 
Because it takes place in the vaulted realm of core political speech, would the First Amendment 
stymie any attempt to outlaw it? Many smart people who have looked at the general problem of 
deceit in campaigns have concluded that the state has no business policing it. But most 
examinations of lies in campaigns involve “real” mistruths told by or about a candidate or issue. 
As identified here, counterfeit campaign speech is different than a lie; the perpetrator has put 
false words in candidates’ mouths or made candidates appear to take physical actions they have 
not. It is a form of fraud. Scholars and courts that have examined campaign deceit acknowledge 
that a narrow prohibition could survive constitutional scrutiny. A ban on counterfeit campaign 
speech fits that bill. This Article explains how it is possible and why it is necessary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Long-held assumptions about First Amendment values in political 
campaigns are being rattled by technology that fuels not just the mass circulation 
of lies, but also the ability to manufacture hyper-realistic candidate source 
material that is indistinguishable from reality.1 More than “fake news” and 
“alternative facts,” this new speech is counterfeit—a faked version of the real 
thing fabricated with the intent to deceive.2 The most vivid example of 
counterfeit campaign speech is the increasingly-discussed problem of “deep 
fakes,” in which cheap and accessible software allows users to manipulate video 
of candidates to make it appear that they are saying or doing something they 
have not in fact said or done.3 This is not simply sophisticated “lip-synching” or 
crude editing.4 Rather, this is the use of artificial intelligence and facial mapping 
technologies to create “digitally real” video or audio depicting the target saying 
or doing something they did not.5 Counterfeit campaign speech can also be 
accomplished through pirated or faked Twitter or Facebook accounts or 
websites,6 or as fake comment submissions in online fora in which an author 
poses as a candidate.7 
We have lived with misleading and falsely-attributed candidate speech in 
various crude and less-crude forms since the dawn of democracy.8 But there is 
 
 1. “Source material,” as used here, refers to material (audio, video, written etc.) that appears to emanate 
from the candidate him or herself (as opposed to statements or material about candidates originating elsewhere). 
 2. See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake News, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 59 
(2018) (making this distinction in the context of faked news generally). 
 3. Deb Riechmann, I Never Said That! High-Tech Deception of “Deepfake” Videos, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(July 2, 2018), https://apnews.com/21fa207a1254401197fd1e0d7ecd14cb.  
 4. Deb Riechmann, Fears Grow Over Deceptive “Deepfake” Videos Made to Sway Elections, TALKING 
POINTS MEMO (July 2, 2018), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/deepfake-videos-adversaries-political-
campaigns-national-security.  
 5. See Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, 
and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (providing an excellent description of how deep 
fake technology works); see also Natasha Lomas, Lyrebird Is a Voice Mimic for the Fake News Era, TECH 
CRUNCH (Apr 25, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/25/lyrebird-is-a-voice-mimic-for-the-fake-news-era/ 
(describing technology that enables realistic faked audio speech using algorithms derived from samples from 
recordings of speakers). 
 6. E.g., Nancy Scola, Twitter to Verify Election Candidates in the Midterms, POLITICO (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/23/twitter-verify-candidates-midterms-2018-1282802 (describing 
Twitter’s new efforts to verify candidate accounts during 2018 midterms). But see Nitasha Tiku, Twitter’s 
Authentication Policy Is a Verified Mess, WIRED (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/twitters-
authentication-policy-is-a-verified-mess/ (explaining that Twitter’s efforts to authenticate accounts on its site 
resulted in a verification system that is “broken” and confusing to users). 
 7. E.g., Hamza Shaban, Two Senators Say Their Identities Were Stolen in Fake Net Neutrality Comments 
to the FCC, WASH. POST (May 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/23/ 
two-senators-say-their-identities-were-stolen-in-fake-net-neutrality-comments-to-the-fcc/?utm_term= 
.aa6c82c05d14. 
 8. While not candidate speech per se, there is ample evidence that the Founders engaged in forgeries. See, 
e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 404, 
409 (2016) (“Both sides [in the debate over the Constitution’s ratification] also published fake letters and essays 
in the newspapers. . . . Madison, referring to ‘an arrant forgery’ in the newspapers reporting that John Jay had 
become an opponent of ratification, complained to Washington that ‘[t]ricks of this sort are not uncommon with 
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something new afoot, both because of advances in technology and profound 
shifts in our information architecture. As described here, counterfeit campaign 
speech is a form of candidate identity theft.9 It is not mere impersonation where 
one acts falsely as another, but instances in which perpetrators, with the intent 
to destabilize an election, make it realistically appear—often through digital 
fabrication—that the campaign material emanates from the candidate when in 
fact it does not.10 It is not spreading false facts about a candidate or her views; 
it is the intentional hijacking of a candidate’s persona with the intention to distort 
democracy.11 It is fraud. 
How best to grapple with the problem of counterfeit campaign speech? 
This Article explores why current laws fall short and why the go-to remedy of 
counter speech is not up to the task. It examines whether a statutory prohibition 
against counterfeit campaign speech is constitutionally possible. Seeking to 
prevent counterfeit campaign speech through legal prohibition seems like a 
radical undertaking.12 First Amendment protections are, after all, at their height 
when it comes to political speech.13 Those who have looked at the general 
problem of deceit in campaigns have concluded that the state cannot 
 
the enemies of the new Constitution.’ . . . In Pennsylvania, Federalist publishers went so far as to deliberately 
distort the published account of the state ratifying convention’s debates to make it appear as if the Constitution 
had been unopposed there.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Jack Nicas, Oprah, Is That You? On Social Media, the Answer is Often No, N.Y. TIMES (July 
7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/07/technology/facebook-instagram-twitter-celebrity-
impostors.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-
region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news (noting that a Facebook earnings document revealed that the site 
contains 80 million fake accounts). 
 10. Digital and audio counterfeit technology is still relatively crude. In the case of audio counterfeiting, 
recent studies have suggested that computer-created fake versions of audio clips seem realistic to only about half 
of listeners. See, e.g., Katherine Shonesy, UAB Research Finds Automated Voice Imitation Can Fool Humans 
and Machines, UAB NEWS (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.uab.edu/news/research/item/6532-uab-research-finds-
automated-voice-imitation-can-fool-humans-and-machines. Deep fake video technology also has yet to be 
perfected. Looking closely, examples are not yet fully convincing. See Supasorn Suwajanakorn, Steven M. Seitz 
& Ira Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, Synthesizing Obama: Learning Lip Sync from Audio, 36 ACM TRANSACTIONS 
ON GRAPHICS 95, July 2017, http://grail.cs.washington.edu/projects/AudioToObama/siggraph17_obama.pdf 
(demonstrating and describing one version of deep fake technology counterfeiting Barack Obama speaking). Yet 
technologists posit that hyper-realistic counterfeiting technology is coming and that when it does, we will lack 
the means to identify the counterfeits it produces as fake. See, e.g., Charlie Warzel, He Predicted the 2016 Fake 
News Crisis. Now He’s Worried About an Information Apocalypse, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 11, 2018) 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/charliewarzel/the-terrifying-future-of-fake-news. 
 11. See, e.g., Symposium, Falsehoods, Fake News, and the First Amendment, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2018); 
particularly Blitz, supra note 2; Helen Norton, (At Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies, 71 OKLA. 
L. REV. 117 (2018); James Weinstein, Free Speech and Domain Allocation: A Suggested Framework for 
Analyzing the Constitutionality of Prohibition of Lies, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 167 (2018). 
 12. The Supreme Court routinely shuts down attempts at adding new categories of constitutional speech 
restrictions. See, e.g., U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2015) (declaring unconstitutional a statute attempting to 
criminalize depictions of animal cruelty); Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (invalidating 
a statute restricting violent video games). 
 13. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (noting that, in the political sphere, First Amendment 
protection is “at its zenith,” and that the burden the state must overcome to justify constraints on political speech 
is “well-nigh insurmountable.”). 
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constitutionally police it.14 But, scholars and courts acknowledge that a narrow 
prohibition could survive constitutional scrutiny.15 As argued here, a ban on 
counterfeit campaign speech fits that bill. 
This Article makes three contributions to the growing body of analysis of 
legal boundaries in our post-truth political environment. First, it identifies 
counterfeit campaign speech as a category of deceptive speech that has yet to be 
exclusively examined. Second, it details the harms that counterfeit campaign 
speech inflicts, suggesting that the state has a compelling interest in protecting 
voters, elections, and candidates from faked candidate speech. And finally, it 
takes scholars and courts up on their invitation to craft a narrowly-tailored 
prohibition of campaign deception by focusing on this narrow category. 16 
The discussion proceeds in five parts. Part I identifies what is and what is 
not counterfeit campaign speech, carving out the contours of its boundaries. Part 
II describes the harms counterfeit campaign speech imposes on voters, the 
election system, and candidates. Part III reviews current laws that might address 
harms emanating from counterfeit campaign speech and concludes they fall 
short. Part IV examines the extent to which the First Amendment protects 
counterfeit campaign speech, suggesting that a ban on counterfeit campaign 
speech could satisfy constitutional scrutiny. Part V then surveys the practical 
hurdles a ban on counterfeit campaign speech faces, even supposing a 
prohibition passes constitutional muster. In the end, this Article suggests that a 
ban on counterfeit campaign speech is both constitutional and needed despite 
the practical challenges, which are most certainly present. 
I. WHAT IS AND WHAT IS NOT COUNTERFEIT CAMPAIGN SPEECH? 
A threshold problem in prohibiting counterfeit campaign speech is a 
definitional one.17 It is well established that a broad rule prohibiting false 
 
 14. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74 MONTANA 
L. REV. 53, 77 (2013) (“[T]he state may no longer have the power to ban or punish malicious false campaign 
speech, whether made by candidates or others.”). 
 15. See id. (“[T]o survive constitutional review, any false campaign speech law would have to be narrow, 
targeted only at false speech made with actual malice.”); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 734–
35 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that a prohibition of deception must be narrowly tailored and must 
require proof of specific harm to identifiable victims); Chesney & Citron, supra note 5 (“[First Amendment 
doctrine] would seem to preclude a sweeping ban on deep fakes, yet it leaves considerable room for carefully 
tailored prohibitions of certain intentionally harmful deep fakes.”). 
 16. See Alvarez , 567 U.S. at 734–35 (noting that statutes can be narrowly tailored to prevent false 
statements).  
 17. Helen Norton offers a helpful taxonomy of lies in elections. See Norton, supra note 11. Using Norton’s 
taxonomy, the closest fit for counterfeit campaign speech in her taxonomy are “lies about the source of speech.” 
Id. at 131-34 (“[M]any election lies involve deceptive aliases and sometimes even outright forgeries to confuse 
or deceive voters about a communication’s actual origins.”). Most forgeries in campaigning in the past have 
involved sending campaign material that appears to come from the campaign itself but is instead manufactured 
by an opponent. See infra Part III.A. Counterfeit campaign speech picks up on this forgery concept, but 
encompasses not just forged campaign materials like leaflets or letters, but also “forgeries” of or related to 
candidates themselves. 
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political speech cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.18 The concept of 
counterfeit campaign speech targets a much narrower field of activity. It does 
not address the problem of faked news generally.19 Instead, it focuses on 
instances in which political candidates’ identities, actions, words, and images 
are intentionally faked with the intent to confuse voters and distort democracy.  
As an initial matter, why worry just about candidates? Why not also 
prohibit faked speech of ordinary citizens or other public figures, like celebrities 
who increasingly face a barrage of injury from faked speech?20 The present 
effort leaves those battles for another day. Counterfeited candidate speech is 
singled out here to address a threat to a process that is a predicate to securing all 
other rights and privileges guaranteed in a democratic system of government. 
There are many instances in which otherwise-constitutionally-protected speech 
is constrained to protect elections.21 The present effort suggests an addition to 
that list.  
A further line drawing problem exists. In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. 
Mansky,22 the Court grappled with the question of whether it was possible to bar 
political speech at polling places. A central question was whether it is possible 
to segregate out “political speech” for purposes of defining what speech the 
statute applied to and did not apply to. As a definitional matter, the statute 
advised that a “political badge, political button, or other political insignia may 
not be worn at or about the polling place on primary or election day.”23 But this 
did not answer the question, according to the Court, of what was and was not 
“political.” The state tried to narrow the definition to “any subject on which a 
political candidate or party has taken a stance.”24 Justice Roberts writing for the 
majority asked, “[w]ould a ‘Support Our Troops’ shirt be banned, if one of the 
candidates or parties had expressed a view on military funding or aid for 
 
 18. Hasen, supra note 14, at 69 (“[B]road laws targeting false speech stand little chance of being upheld 
regardless of the topic. A court undoubtedly would strike down a broad statute prohibiting false campaign 
statements made in any place and at any time.”). 
 19. For an artful argument aimed at achieving this broader goal, see Blitz, supra note 2. The U.S. Senate 
is currently deliberating a bill that would achieve this broader result. See Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act 
of 2018, S. 3805, 115th Cong. (2018).  
 20. Celebrities are increasingly subject to celebrity identity theft that has real and frightening 
consequences. See Nicas, supra note 9 (describing the problem of celebrity ID theft).  
 21. See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1816 (1999) (noting “limits on what voters are permitted to express at the ballot 
box; mandatory disclosure obligations on the identity of political speakers; content-based regulations of electoral 
speech . . . like electioneering near polling places . . . [and] selective bans on contributions from some speakers” 
[such as foreigners] (footnotes omitted)); see also Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285 
(D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012); C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 24-33 (1998); Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics 
Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1753-55 (1999). 
 22. 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018) (holding that Minnesota’s ban of political apparel in polling places 
unconstitutionally restricts a form of expression protected by First Amendment). 
 23. MINN. STAT. § 211B.11(1) (2018). 
 24. Minn. Voters Alliance, 138 S. Ct. at 1881. 
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veterans? What about a ‘#MeToo’ shirt, referencing the movement to increase 
awareness of sexual harassment and assault?”25  
The prohibition of counterfeit campaign speech considered here escapes 
this definitional quagmire. A court need not dither with the question of whether 
the speech is political or not; if a person has intentionally tried to pass off speech 
as emanating from a candidate running for public office, regardless of its 
content, the prohibition kicks in.26 In the world of campaign finance, speech may 
be regulated if it refers to a clearly identified candidate or the image or likeness 
of a clearly identified candidate.27 Likewise, in the case of counterfeit campaign 
speech, speech would only fall within a prohibition’s ambit if it were falsified 
source material supposedly emanating from a specific, clearly identifiable 
candidate running for office.28 Other counterfeits—like a fabricated video of a 
riot, faked evidence of a “crisis actor” in a school shooting, or a doctored image 
of an immigrant toddler—even if attempting to distort an electoral result, would 
not be implicated.29 Counterfeit speech relating to policy issues would also be 
excluded from the proposed prohibition.30 
 
 25. Id. at 1890. Scholars have questioned whether this line-drawing problem is, in fact, a problem at all. 
See, e.g., Schauer & Pildes, supra note 21, at 1827 (“It is of course true that the line separating electoral speech 
from non-electoral speech would necessarily be both fuzzy and porous, and it is equally true that this would limit 
the effectiveness of any election-specific principles. But it is important to note that there is no reason to suppose 
that this line would be either more fuzzy or more porous than, say, the line between commercial speech and 
other forms of speech protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 26. Marc Blitz discusses this distinction, arguing that the First Amendment might accommodate the 
“restriction of one method of making the case for a belief (through altered video) but not another (by a verbal 
performance intended to give the false impression that certain memories and experiences actually occurred.)” 
See Blitz, supra note 2, at 112.  
 27. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976) (“[I]n order to preserve the provision against invalidation on 
vagueness grounds, [the campaign finance regulation at issue] must be construed to apply only to expenditures 
for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate”). 
Because a prohibition of counterfeit campaign speech focuses on the speech of candidates themselves, it avoids 
the same vagueness problem Buckley confronted with speech about candidates; see also, Schauer & 
Pildes, supra note 21, at 1828 (noting that regulation of campaign finance survives First Amendment scrutiny if 
it regulates “communication that occurs within a specified time period of a particular election [or] that refers to 
a clearly identified candidate or features the image or likeness of a clearly identified candidate.”). 
 28. The prohibition could be further narrowed to mimic campaign finance regulations that govern speech 
only for a specific number of days prior to a primary or general election. Citizens United v. FEC involved a 
regulation that placed limits based on the timing of election speech. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 321 (2010) (discussing federal statute defining an “electioneering communication . . . 
as ‘any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication’ that ‘refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal 
office’ and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election [citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) 
(2012)].”). 
 29. Kevin Roose, Debunking 5 Viral Images of the Migrant Caravan, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/world/americas/migrant-caravan-fake-images-news.html  
(writing about the photos of the caravan coming from Honduras that were “debunked” as being misrepresented 
and mislabeled); Kim Lacapria, Crisis Actors Uncovered?, SNOPES (Oct. 26, 2015), 
https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/same-girl-crying-now-oregon/ (debunking crisis actor claims from Sandy 
Hook and Parkland shootings). 
 30. What if a member of a candidate’s family is “deep faked” specifically to harm the candidate’s chances 
of election? What if a candidate is made to appear next to a controversial figure with the aim of doing harm to 
the campaign (for example, in the commercial context, the famous Benneton advertising campaign that featured 
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Another question revolves around what might constitute falsification or 
manipulation. A clear case would involve the perpetrator creating a deep fake 
audio or video of a candidate saying something she did not in fact say. But other 
kinds of manipulations might be harder to label. For example, would such a ban 
cover statements taken out of context? Suppose a candidate gave a public speech 
in which she promised, “I don’t believe we should get rid of all immigrants!” 
What if her opponent then aired an attack ad using video of that speech edited 
such that the candidate utters the stand-alone statement: “We should get rid of 
all immigrants!” Is this counterfeit campaign speech?31 
One argument for not including such edited-but-real candidate speech 
within the ambit of a counterfeit campaign speech prohibition is that its 
deception is more easily verifiable.32 Participants in the political process should 
be encouraged to get the full story; the media and campaigns should work to 
expose context—here, to air the full clip of a candidate’s speech. The problem 
discussed here arises only when there is no means, at least that we can reasonably 
expect voters to employ, to discern truth from falsity. In the case of counterfeit 
campaign speech, the counterfeiter has fabricated source material such that 
additional work and/or more speech cannot cure the harm.33 Selective editing is 
less pernicious than counterfeiting, assuming ready means are available to the 
public and press to expose the context of the candidate’s remarks.34 The same 
 
prominent figures kissing, including The Pope and a Muslim leader)? See Riazat Butt, Benetton Tears Down 
Pope-Kissing Ads After Vatican Legal Threat, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2011), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/17/benetton-pope-kissing-ads. What if the doctored image does 
not feature the candidate’s face or voice, but shows a falsified image of his car heading into the parking lot of a 
motel, claiming an illicit affair? Borrowing from the campaign finance context, one approach would be to include 
such indirect reference through a prohibition of counterfeits that refer to a clearly identified candidate. For some, 
such a prohibition sweeps up too huge a swath of speech. For that reason, the proposed prohibition here would 
address only counterfeited speech of the candidate him or herself and would not include speech that could be 
seen to “refer” to the candidate in some way. 
 31. What about the video of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi doctored to make her seem inebriated? See Sarah 
Mervosh, Distorted Videos of Nancy Pelosi circulate on Facebook and Twitter, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019) 
(describing how some social media platforms removed the doctored video while others, including Facebook, did 
not and citing other examples of manipulated video) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/us/politics/pelosi-
doctored-video.html. The Pelosi video’s distortion did not involve new-fangled technology. Its creators simply 
slowed down passages to make it appear that the Speaker was slurring her words. Id. Putting aside that Pelosi is 
a sitting official and not a candidate, would a ban on counterfeit campaign speech cover such distortion? 
Assuming its creators could not credibly mount a parody defense, there is a strong argument to include it within 
the ambit of counterfeit campaign speech. It is difficult to see how to distinguish it from a deep fake, the 
paradigmatic example of counterfeit campaign speech. How much damage would the Pelosi video have done 
circulated on the eve of an election in which she was a candidate? Should would-be creators of the distorted 
video be deterred from circulating it prior to an election by a criminal ban? The answer offered here is yes. 
 32. Even obvious deceptions, however, fall prey to the “balance trap.” See Chris Edelson, Lies, Damned 
Lies, and Journalism: Why Journalists Are Failing to Vindicate First Amendment Values and How a New 
Definition of “The Press” Can Help, 91 OR. L. REV. 527, 581–83 (2012) (describing the press’ failure to call 
out inaccuracies in campaign material in the interest of appearing “balanced” in coverage). 
 33. See infra Subpart II.A. 
 34. A harder question: what if the edited candidate speech cannot be verified? What if candidate speech is 
edited, but no original exists (or, at least, is not publicly available) that would enable the public to confirm its 
falsity? Perhaps in this instance the law should require the selective editor to post a publicly-available full clip 
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cannot be said of counterfeit campaign speech, which passes fake speech off as 
real.35  
What about a distortion of candidates’ positions? Does this fall under the 
proposed prohibition? Imagine a candidate gave a public speech supporting 
constraints on illegal immigration. Suppose further that an independent group 
ran a political advertisement using portions of that speech with added images 
that suggest she also supports separating immigrant children from their parents 
when, in fact, she does not.36 Has the independent group engaged in counterfeit 
campaign speech? The prohibition advocated here would only prevent that 
independent group from materially altering a candidate’s message and passing 
it off as authentic; it would only reach manipulation of candidate source 
material. Inaccurate representations of candidates’ positions that do not 
materially alter the statements or actions of candidates would not constitute 
counterfeit campaign speech.37 Why? The nub of the problem is voters’ inability 
to discern truth from falsity of counterfeit campaign speech.38 When a 
candidate’s views are distorted, but not through manipulation of their voice or 
image, it is up to the candidate and campaign to correct the distortion. In the case 
 
of the unedited-version. This solution seems unworkable in the extreme, given how commonly clips of candidate 
speech circulate and how common the practice of selective editing is. We have seen versions of this very real 
problem of selective editing surface. See, e.g., Dave Levitan, Unspinning the Planned Parenthood Video, 
FACTCHECK.ORG (July 21, 2015), https://www.factcheck.org/2015/07/unspinning-the-planned-parenthood-
video/. There are no easy answers. One possibility is to leave it to courts to discern whether the requisite intent 
to mislead voters, undermine the electoral process, and harm a candidate’s chance of electoral success is present. 
 35. See infra Part IV.A. An obvious retort might be that a candidate can refute the counterfeit speech by 
calling it out as fake. This is the option candidates are currently left with. When someone sent a counterfeited 
text message appearing to emanate from U.S. Senate candidate Beto O’Rourke’s campaign, he issued numerous 
denials. And, to a degree, this was enough to cure at least some of the problem. But the “it’s fake” remedy falls 
short for a number of reasons. First, it assumes the candidate is aware of the faked speech circulating. Second, 
it assumes that telling voters after the fact that the material is fake adequately cures the harm done. See infra 
Part IV. Third, in a world in which multitudes of fakes are circulating, this remedy becomes wholly ineffective. 
In the case of the O’Rourke text, the faked text emanated from a volunteer using a campaign platform run by a 
third-party provider. See Issy Lapowsky, Fake Beto O’Rourke Texts Expose New Playground for Trolls, WIRED 
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/fake-beto-orourke-texts-expose-new-playground-for-trolls/. As 
the story points out, “[l]ucky for O’Rourke, the message the rogue texter sent was outrageous enough to be easily 
dismissed as a troll. But what if a slightly savvier bad actor tweaked the message in a way the average voter 
could believe?” Id. 
 36. Distortion-through-editing is a common phenomenon in politics. See Levitan supra note 34, discussing 
the Planned Parenthood example. 
 37. Note that, as explored below in Subpart III.B, distortions may form the basis of a successful false light 
claim. William Prosser, when originally defining the tort of false light, listed as an example the unauthorized 
use of a person’s name as a candidate for office. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 399 
(1960). Prosser does disservice to this contention, however, by citing a case from 1893 that does not involve a 
candidate (plaintiff sued over use of his picture in a newspaper contest). The cited case also suggests a clear 
exception for candidates for office. See Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 291 (1893) (noting that when people 
“transgress the law, invoke its aid, or put themselves up as candidates for public favor, they warrant criticism, 
and ought not to complain of it.”). But see Battaglia v. Adams 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964) (finding that 
unauthorized use of an individual’s name in connection with a candidacy for public office is a violation of his 
right of privacy). 
 38. See infra Subpart II.A. 
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of faked candidate speech, the public is supplied two versions of the reality, 
setting up an impossible fix for the campaign.  
What about counterfeited campaign speech produced for non-malicious 
ends (i.e., designed to enhance the reputation of a candidate)? What if a 
candidate’s supporter produced a deep fake in an attempt to make the candidate 
appear more favorably? Suppose, for example, a supporter deep faked a 
candidate with a history of racist remarks such that she seemed to be praising 
the contributions of minorities? The nature of the resultant harm parallels the 
harm the false light tort seeks to prevent—providing plaintiffs a remedy for 
being depicted falsely, even if the depiction is a positive one.39 For this reason, 
the intent prong cannot focus solely on harm to candidates, but must target intent 
to confuse voters and distort the democratic process, harms discussed below.40 
Another hard problem is one of timing.41 In the modern campaign 
environment, candidates may announce they are running for election many, 
many months in advance. And those elected can begin reelection campaigns 
soon after taking office. The existence of the “perpetual campaign”42 makes it 
difficult to confine the prohibition suggested here.43 Since the real damage is 
done when candidates lack sufficient time to educate voters that material is 
counterfeited, one possibility is to limit the prohibition to counterfeits circulated 
for some fixed period prior to the election itself.44 In the campaign finance 
 
 39. See infra note 165. Helen Norton also wrestles with regulating reputation-enhancing campaign lies. 
Helen Norton, Lies to Manipulate, Misappropriate, and Acquire Government Power, in LAW AND LIES: 
DECEPTION AND TRUTH-TELLING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 143, 180–90 (Austin D. Sarat ed., 2015). 
 40. In comments on an earlier draft of this Article, Professor Marc Blitz suggested an intriguing solution 
to the intent problem. One approach might be to stop short of banning counterfeit campaign speech, but instead 
require the circulator of counterfeited campaign speech to provide a disclaimer that the material is faked. Failure 
to attach such a disclaimer to knowingly counterfeited campaign speech would result in liability. E-mail from 
Professor Marc J. Blitz, Alan Joseph Bennett Professor of Law, Okla. City Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Feb. 2, 
2019, 8:14 PM EST) (on file with author). The proposal suggested herein retains a ban on counterfeit campaign 
speech but exempts circulation of counterfeit campaign speech clearly identified as fake.  
 41. Discussed infra Subpart V.B.  
 42. See generally FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL 
CAMPAIGN (2016) (explaining the recent hostility between members of different political parties); William A. 
Galston, Politics & Ideas: The ‘Permanent Campaign’ = Perpetual Paralysis, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2014, at 
A17; Molly Ball, President Trump’s Perpetual Campaign, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 6, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/the-power-of-president-trump/509684/. 
 43. Another timing issue: what if someone created counterfeit speech using footage of a sitting official 
who later ran for office? Would that person’s activity become a crime the moment that official declares her 
candidacy? California legislators seeking to address “bot” participation in political speech are encountering this 
same issue. See Jonah Engel Bromwich, Bots of the Internet, Reveal Yourselves!, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/style/how-to-regulate-bots.html. The proposed legislation would require 
automated social media accounts seeking to influence elections to identify themselves as bots. Ryan Calo, a co-
director at the University of Washington’s Tech Policy Lab, wonders how this would work, particularly when 
bot participation precedes a person running for office. See id. (“Political commentary comes in different 
forms . . . . Imagine a concerned citizen sets up a bot to criticize a particular official for failing to act on climate 
change. Now say that official runs for re-election. Is the concerned citizen now in violation of [the proposed] 
California law?”). 
 44. Note that a further definitional problem is whether the prohibition should be aimed at the timing of 
when the counterfeited material is distributed versus when it is discovered to be fake. 
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context, the Supreme Court has blessed regulating “electioneering 
communication” that occurs within thirty days before a primary and sixty days 
before a general election.45 Since counterfeits can be extremely difficult to 
detect, perhaps the window for the prohibition proposed here should be longer. 
Whatever the time period, bounding the prohibition to a specific window of time 
would help narrow its application. 
Equally difficult is navigating exemptions for the news media and political 
commentary. The July 30, 2018 cover of Time Magazine featured a morphed 
image combining Donald Trump’s face with Vladimir Putin’s.46 The eerie 
photoshopped image was meant as commentary on Trump’s Russia policies and 
the question of collusion. Could political commentary that “distorts” candidate 
images for purposes of making a political point constitute banned counterfeit 
campaign speech? The answer has to be no, but how could a law reasonably 
distinguish between political commentary by members of the media (an ever-
broadening category)47 versus prohibited counterfeit campaign speech? Again, 
the intent prong is one source of resolution. In this example, Time Magazine is 
not attempting to trick or defraud the public by passing off the image as real with 
a malicious intent to confuse voters and undermine democracy. Ensuring such a 
ban does not inhibit robust political commentary is essential.  
A final and related definitional hurdle is that any successful effort to 
regulate counterfeited candidate speech must carve out parody. The long history 
of political parody in this country requires that political parodies of candidates 
involving manipulated voice and images and other source material be protected 
speech.48 This is no less true of the proliferation of comic memes of candidates 
online. Now perhaps more than ever the need for collective comic relief amidst 
our fraught election environment is great. But a parody carve-out creates an 
 
 45. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (ruling the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act constitutional). 
 46. Nancy Burson, Magazine Cover Photograph of a Photoshopped Mashup of Trump and Putin’s Faces, 
TIME MAGAZINE, (July 30, 2018). 
 47. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Tucker Lecture, Law and Media Symposium, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449, 
1452, 1465 (2009) (“If special protections were given to the institutional press, how would lines ever be drawn 
in light of the democratization of access to the media? . . . [L]aws that do provide special protections to the 
institutional press need to be reconsidered and be expanded . . . .”). 
 48. Any regular viewer of web content can attest to the ever-presence of political memes. Political memes 
put words into candidate’s mouths with regularity. Candidates targeted by memes have tried a variety of legal 
tools to seek redress. As an example, Debbie King, a local Republican Party vice chair in Haywood County, 
North Carolina, filed an invasion of privacy by appropriation and intentional infliction of emotional distress suit 
against an activist member of a splinter faction of the Republican Party who circulated a meme of King using 
doctored images to depict her in compromising circumstances. King’s complaint alleges that she suffered 
“emotional psychological distress, embarrassment, humiliation, physical disability, loss of appetite [and] stress.” 
Cory Vaillancourt, Haywood GOP Officer Sues Over Mocking Memes, SMOKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Feb. 14, 
2018), https://www.smokymountainnews.com/news/item/24219-haywood-gop-officer-sues-over-mocking-
memes. Do political memes that use various effects to put words in candidates’ mouths rise to the level of 
counterfeit campaign speech? While potentially actionable in tort, unless the meme attempts to pass off faked 
candidate material as real with intent to harm voters and distort the electoral process, memes fit squarely into 
the parody exception.  
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obvious line-drawing problem.49 This can be a dangerous line to draw but should 
not sink the project. Courts regularly engage in analyses of intent. One has only 
to look at defamation, copyright, and trademark jurisprudence to see the 
regularity of the task.50  
Given these many definitional hurdles, what would a prohibition of 
counterfeit campaign speech look like?51 A prohibition of counterfeit campaign 
speech imagined here would impose criminal sanction for the knowing 
manufacture of fake images, audio or other material of an identifiable candidate 
for public office, published within [a specified number of] days prior to an 
election, with intent to deceive voters and distort the electoral process.52 
 
 49. Lili Loofbourow, How Conservative Trolls Lost Their Mojo: It’s Hard to DGAF Once You’re in Power, 
SLATE (July 8, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/07/trolls-and-the-trump-gop-are-sounding-
awfully-alike.html (describing how internet trolls commonly assert that hate speech was “a joke.”). Another 
interesting example that arguably falls in a parody grey area is an effort by a Trump campaign consultant to 
create fake websites of Democratic presidential candidates. As the New York Times describes the mock Joe 
Biden site, JoeBiden.info, it “breezily mocks the candidate in terms that would warm the heart of any Bernie 
Sanders supporter: There are GIFs of Mr. Biden touching women and girls, and blurbs about his less-than-liberal 
policy positions, including his opposition to court-ordered busing in the 1970s and his support for the Iraq war. 
Pull quotes highlight some of his more famous verbal gaffes.…The introductory text declares, ‘Uncle Joe is back 
and ready to take a hands-on approach to America’s problems!’” Matthew Rosenberg, Trump Consultant is 
Trolling Democrats with Biden Site that Isn’t Biden’s, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/us/politics/fake-joe-biden-website.html. Whether or not the site intends 
it, many site users believe the site to emanate from the Biden campaign. Language at the foot of the webpage 
notes that the site “is a political parody built and paid for ‘BY AN American citizen FOR American citizens,’ 
and not the work of any campaign or political action committee.” Id.  
 50. Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 
1422-23 (2011) (noting that “parodies are generally protected speech under several doctrines, including 
defamation, copyright infringement, and trademark infringement, in part because the impersonation concerns 
are minimized—in other words, parodies will typically be understood to be the defendant’s speech and not the 
plaintiff’s.” (citing People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001) (“A 
parody must convey two simultaneous—and contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also that it 
is not the original and is instead a parody. To the extent that an alleged parody conveys only the first message, 
it is not only a poor parody but also vulnerable under trademark law, since the customer will be confused.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)). We may be wary of an intent standard for campaign 
speech. What if the intent is to make a profit? See Samantha Subramanian, Inside the Macedonian Fake News 
Complex, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news/. What if the 
speaker simply intends to provoke debate? What if the speaker’s intent is to be mischievous? Do these 
motivations constitute requisite intent for this proposed prohibition? See infra Part III (describing multiple legal 
strategies to address fraudulent speech using an intent standard); see also, Golb v. Att’y Gen. of New York, 870 
F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2017) (“While it is true that a parody enjoys First Amendment protection notwithstanding 
that not everybody will get the joke, it is also true that parody depends on somebody getting the joke; parody 
succeeds only by its recognition as parody. An author who intends to fool everyone may be pulling a prank or 
perpetrating a hoax, but the result is not a parody.”). 
 51. The National Labor Relations Board uses a similar distinction after it abandoned attempts to examine 
the truth or falsity of campaign statements by parties to a representation election (and set aside elections based 
on misleading campaign statements). See Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982). The NLRB set 
aside elections on the basis of one of the parties using forged or altered documents that the voters did not 
recognize as propaganda. See NLRB v. E.A. Sween Co., 640 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 52. This exploration purposefully dodges the question of whether the prohibition explored should emanate 
from state or federal law and what the penalty for a criminal prohibition should be. For present purposes, this 
discussion examines whether such a law—in whatever form—would be constitutional and/or advisable. 
H - GREEN_22 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019  6:35 PM 
August 2019] COUNTERFEIT CAMPAIGN SPEECH 1457 
Importantly, the prohibition contemplated here would exempt counterfeit 
campaign speech that is clearly identified as fake.53 
Having developed this standard to cabin a counterfeit campaign speech 
prohibition, the next part identifies the harms counterfeit campaign speech 
inflicts, and asks whether counterfeit campaign speech offers any benefits? 
II. COUNTERFEIT CAMPAIGN SPEECH: WHAT’S THE HARM? 
The harm that counterfeited candidate speech imposes cuts to the core of 
democratic discourse. It is not the vague problem of “fake news” (though it is 
certainly a constituent form). It does not come down to simple “misleading” or 
“distorted” speech that falls on the edge of a blurry line of truth versus falsity. It 
is not a lie only in the eye of the beholder.54 Rather, counterfeit campaign speech 
inflicts three distinct and overlapping harms: it purposely thwarts the voting 
public’s means of determining the truth about candidates seeking office; it 
threatens to undermine elections; and it prevents candidates from controlling 
their core identity.55 
A. HARM TO VOTERS 
Counterfeit campaign speech threatens a right that is preservative of all 
other rights: the right to vote.56 Imagine a voter who views multiple 
counterfeited speeches of a candidate and decides to vote for that candidate 
 
 53. Proposed legislation in California takes this approach, exempting any material that includes this 
disclaimer: “this (video/audio) has been manipulated.” See Andrew Sheeler, California Is Moving to Ban Deep 
Fakes. What Are They, Anyway? THE SACRAMENTO BEE (July 1, 2019), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
government/capitol-alert/article232162032.html (describing proposed bill AB 730). Likewise, California 
legislators used this approach to address the problem of fake “bots.” Bromwich, supra note 43 (describing 
legislation that “would compel automated social media accounts to identify themselves as bots—in other words, 
to disclose their non-personhood.”). Richard Hasen advocates a disclaimer-only rule. See Richard L. Hasen, 
Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election Law in a Post-Truth World, ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2020) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3418427). 
 54. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Knowing Falsehoods, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 
28, 2012), http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/28/freedom-of-speech-and-knowing-falsehoods/ (noting that 
general bans on campaign lies are problematic “because they cover a wide range of territory in which the truth 
may be hard to uncover, and in some measure in the eyes of the beholder.”). 
 55. These concerns animate Nate Persily and Jack Goldsmith’s dire warnings that Democracy could meet 
its doom at the hands of the Internet. See Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet, 28 J. 
DEMOCRACY 63, 64 (2017) (arguing that the “2016 election represents the latest chapter in the disintegration of 
the legacy institutions that had set bounds for U.S. politics in the post-war era.”); Jack Goldsmith, The Failure 
of Internet Freedom, in EMERGING THREATS, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE 15 (David Pozen ed., 2018), 
https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Emerging_Threats_Goldsmith.pdf (“The internet has 
made speech cheap to produce and to aggregate. This has allowed private actors to engage in vicious group 
attacks by ‘troll armies’ that aim to discredit or to destroy the reputation of disfavored speakers and to discourage 
them from speaking again. A related practice is to distort or overcome disfavored speech by using fake news, 
fake commentators, and other forms of misinformation or propaganda to muffle the disfavored speech or confuse 
the audience.”). 
 56. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“Though [voting is] not regarded strictly as a natural 
right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its will under certain conditions, nevertheless 
it is regarded as a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.”). 
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based on the falsified positions she believes that candidate to hold. Imagine 
further that the candidate she has voted for in fact holds views diametrically 
opposed to her own. Her right to vote has been nullified; worse, it has been 
turned against her.  
Counterfeit campaign speech deprives voters of agency, the ability to 
absorb “real” information from candidates to make informed decisions about 
who should represent them in government. This deprivation can also be 
described as a loss of voters’ personal autonomy. Seana Valentine Shiffrin 
argues that protecting listener agency is an important interest behind government 
prohibitions of lying and a critical component of what the First Amendment 
protects.57 Counterfeit campaign speech inflicts a loss of personal autonomy 
upon the listener; deception robs them of personal will at the ballot box.58 
One might argue that voters have the duty to diligently investigate the 
candidates up for election. This sentiment underpins the Supreme Court’s 
unwillingness to accept “preventing voter confusion” as an asserted interest 
supporting laws that would curtail false political speech generally.59 If a voter 
reads a sloppy news article and concludes wrongly that a candidate is pro-
immigration, that voter must work to confirm that stance prior to casting her 
vote. But counterfeited candidate speech makes the voter’s job next to 
impossible; how can the voter discern which primary source to believe? The 
voter is not only tasked with determining the authenticity of the counterfeited 
candidate speech (difficult even for forensic computer scientists);60 the voter 
must put all speech from all candidates to an authenticity test if counterfeit 
campaign speech is allowed to run rampant. Voters may then question the true 
origin of every real word candidates utter, leaving them unable to determine who 
to believe or where to start in figuring out what is real and what is fake. This is 
far too much to ask of voters. At least for now, people are programmed to believe 
 
 57. SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 79 (2014).  
 58. Id. (“Both the prohibition on lying and the prohibition of wrongful deception work, in different ways, 
to protect the ability of listeners to rely on speech to develop understandings of one another and of the world. 
These understandings are essential . . . to enable us to act well, in concert, and pursue our collective moral 
ends.”). See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978); Alan K. Chen, Free 
Speech, Rational Deliberation, and Some Truth About Lies, at 18 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(describing the political harm in the face of campaign lies when a “listener casts a vote in a different way than 
she otherwise would have, or campaigns for or protests against a particular candidate or cause based on a false 
understanding of the relevant background facts.”). See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 50 (arguing that the public 
has an interest in the soundness of the foundation of an individual’s reputation). 
 59. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 375–76 (1997) (“[T]he argument 
that the burden on First Amendment interests is justified by [the State’s interest in preventing voter confusion] 
is meritless and severely underestimates the intelligence of the typical voter. We have noted more than once that 
‘[a] State’s claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of 
information to them must be viewed with some skepticism.’” (citing Eu v. S.F. Democratic Cty. Cent. 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228 (1989))). 
 60. See infra Subpart V.A. 
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speech heard from the proverbial horse’s mouth, so much so that courts have 
blessed this assumption.61  
Some argue it is not the role of government to make voters’ lives easier.62 
According to this view, the “government has no paternalistic role over matters 
of the intellect, just as it has no paternalistic role over matters of the soul. It is 
up to individual citizens alone to sort out truth from falsehood.”63 It does seem 
fair to require voters to parse statements taken out of context and even ferret out 
overt lies told about and by candidates. And they have help: political opponents, 
the press, friends, and family members will all engage a citizen’s quest to 
distinguish truth from falsehood. But there is something fundamentally different 
about foisting on voters the burden of flushing out counterfeited candidate 
speech. At least at present, we are trained to believe what we see and hear with 
our own eyes and ears.64  
In an article describing what she calls “Empirical Liberty,” Professor Jane 
Bambauer suggests that,  
[T]he performance of the “marketplace of ideas” depends on our ability to 
validate and invalidate competing claims. Most claims, whether trivial 
(statements about a consumer good) or profound (statements about health, 
politics, or economic theory) are empirical claims that should be accepted or 
rejected by their audience on evidentiary grounds that the listeners can 
experience for themselves.65  
If voters are confronted with rampant counterfeit campaign speech which 
cannot readily be verified as real or fake, the marketplace shuts down. As 
Professor Bambauer describes, “[t]he proverbial marketplace cannot function if 
listeners are unable to access information or run the experiments they need to 
assess the validity of the claims that are offered to them.”66 The lack of 
“Empirical Liberty” is precisely the harm counterfeit campaign speech inflicts 
on voters. It denies listeners the ability to discern authenticity in the political 
 
 61. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A]udio and audiovisual recording 
are uniquely reliable and powerful methods of preserving and disseminating news and information about events 
that occur in public. Their self-authenticating character makes it highly unlikely that other methods could be 
considered reasonably adequate substitutes.”); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Howard 
Wasserman, Video Evidence and Summary Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 JUDICATURE 180, 
181 (2008) (describing how the Court reached its “decision on summary judgment, on its determination that a 
video of the chase, taken from the pursuing officer’s dash-mounted camera, presented the single ‘true’ version 
of events and permitted the Court to ignore contradictory testimony from the plaintiff.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless Untruths, 
36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2008) (describing the perspective that speech restrictions that prevent voters from 
being led astray are wrong-headed because “those who hear the statements . . . are too lazy or dim-witted to sort 
out truth from falsehood.”). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 at 607; see also Scott, 550 U.S. 372; Wasserman, supra note 61. 
 65. Jane R. Bambauer, The Empirical First Amendment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 947 (2017). This idea is 
hinted at in Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 718 (“‘[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless [because] they 
interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas” (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988))). 
 66. Bambauer, supra note 65, at 947. 
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sphere.67 Voters have the right to receive information about candidates that is 
verifiable. When candidate source material is counterfeited, that ability is 
grievously foiled. 
A final and related harm is voter disillusionment. Scholars have already 
expressed concern that the scourge of fake news may cause voters to 
disengage.68 Voters confronted with rampant and unchecked counterfeit 
campaign speech might reasonably conclude that the effort required to determine 
what a candidate truly believes and what a candidate has done or not done is too 
great. The specter of large-scale voter disengagement leads to the second 
category of harm that counterfeit campaign speech inflicts: harm to the electoral 
process itself. 
B. HARM TO THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
The Supreme Court has recognized the government’s compelling interest 
in upholding the integrity of elections in numerous cases,69 noting that “[o]ther 
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”70 
Quoting this phrase, Justice Scalia wrote (in a dissenting opinion) that, “no 
justification for regulation is more compelling than protection of the electoral 
process.”71 A proliferation of counterfeit campaign speech threatens to 
undermine public faith in the electoral system and the political process. To 
uphold the integrity of elections, ensuring that voters have access to accurate 
source material about candidates is a necessary precursor to an informed 
citizenry. The “consent theory of democracy,” enshrined in the U.S. 
 
 67. Id. at 951 (“[W]ithout Empirical Liberty, people do not have the means to gather data and test 
competing propositions for themselves. A First Amendment that [does not enable] Empirical Liberty may not 
actually be very scientific at all if the laws leave few opportunities for testing. Instead, it trades one monolithic, 
governmental, or religious authority for millions of individual king-popes who must resort to unscientific 
hunches or senseless beliefs since they cannot empirically test any of the competing claims.”). 
 68. Toni M. Massaro & Robin Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy, and Emerging Evidence 
on Civility and Effective Democratic Engagement, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 434 (2012) (“[E]xtreme incivility, 
including . . . ‘deceptive messages’ . . . may well cause voters to disengage, thereby diminishing political 
participation.”); see also Warzel, supra note 10 (describing what one technologist calls “‘reality apathy’: Beset 
by a torrent of constant misinformation, people simply start to give up . . . . ‘People stop paying attention to news 
and that fundamental level of informedness required for functional democracy becomes unstable.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 69. Courts routinely cite preserving the integrity of elections as such. See Susan B. Anthony List v. 
Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 473 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Ohio’s interests in preserving the integrity of its elections, 
protecting ‘voters from confusion and undue influence,’ and ‘ensuring that an individual’s right to vote is not 
undermined by fraud in the election process’ are compelling.” (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 
(1992) (plurality opinion))). The majority also noted that “[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the 
right to vote is undermined.” Id. at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); see also Eu, 489 
U.S. at 231 (“A State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.”). 
 70. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
 71. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 379 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia noted 
further that Ohio’s interest in preventing fraud and libel “carries special weight during election campaigns when 
false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences for the public at large.” Id. at 349. 
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Constitution,72 is based on the idea that “the citizen’s ability to make informed 
political choices is a necessary predicate to a truly representative democracy.”73 
The state therefore has a compelling interest in ensuring elections are not 
distorted by faked candidate speech. If the voting public is defrauded by 
morphed campaign speech, our system of elections is effectively destroyed. 
Rampant and unchecked counterfeit campaign speech undermines faith in 
candidates and political campaigns, causing voters to distrust anything any 
candidate says or does that they do not witness in person.74 The damage to the 
democratic electoral process is existential. 
The Supreme Court has approved of the government’s compelling interest 
in providing accurate information to voters to inform their decisions at the ballot 
box. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of campaign finance 
disclosure.75 Both campaign finance disclosure rules and a prohibition of 
counterfeit campaign speech are, at their core, about protecting the right of the 
public to accurate information about candidates.76 Campaign finance law sets 
limits on campaign contributions,77 and important for these purposes, sets out 
disclosure rules to inform voters about political contributions.78 Time and again 
the Court has since found various spending limitations unconstitutional.79 But 
the Court, in near-unanimous rulings, has thus far resolutely upheld disclosure 
rules.80 The Court has acknowledged that a primary government interest in 
requiring disclosure is to “insure that the voters are fully informed.”81 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, for example, the Court 
issued a sharply divided 5-4 decision holding that Congress could not 
 
 72. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .”).  
 73. Raleigh Hannah Levine, The (Un)Informed Electorate: Insights into the Supreme Court’s Electoral 
Speech Cases, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 225, 229; see also James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: 
Judicial Dilution of Consent Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 443, 456-
59 (describing the consent theory as the basis of the right to vote).  
 74. And maybe even then, in the case of realistic, faked holograms. See, e.g., Colin Lecher, French 
Presidential Candidate Mélenchon Uses “Hologram” Optical Illusion to Appear in Seven Places, THE VERGE 
(Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/4/19/15357360/melenchon-france-election-hologram. 
 75. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1974) (“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability 
of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential . . . .”). 
 76. Schauer & Pildes, supra note 21, at 1825 (1999) (“[T]he question is whether regulation should be 
permissible to remedy various perceived pathologies of current electoral discourse, even if that same degree of 
government intervention would be impermissible to remedy the parallel pathologies of non-electoral discourse 
in roughly comparable situations.”). 
 77. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116 (West 2014) (setting a limit on campaign contributions to federal candidates). 
 78. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 30104 (West 2015) (setting out reporting requirements). 
 79. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S at 143 (holding that caps on campaign expenditures are unconstitutional). 
 80. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366–72 (2010) (upholding federal 
campaign finance disclosure requirements by an 8-1 vote). 
 81. Buckley, 424 U.S at 14–15, 76. (“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the 
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential.”). Likewise, the Court in McConnell 
v. Federal Election Commission upheld disclosure provisions in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 
holding that such disclosure would help citizens “make informed choices in the political marketplace.” 540 U.S. 
93, 197 (2003) (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
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constitutionally ban independent corporate campaign speech.82 But on the 
question of whether the state could require corporations to disclose campaign 
spending, the Court ruled 8-1 that it could. Justice Kennedy, quoting an earlier 
campaign finance case, wrote: 
“Identification of the source of advertising may be required as a 
means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the 
arguments to which they are being subjected.” At the very least, the 
disclaimers avoid confusion by making clear that the ads are not 
funded by a candidate or political party.83  
In its campaign finance decisions, the Court struck a bargain: individuals and 
corporations should be able to spend freely to forward their political messages, 
but the public must have information about where funding comes from.84 These 
same principles animate the state’s interest in banning counterfeit campaign 
speech. State law prohibits individuals or groups from submitting falsified 
records about the source of funds.85 Ensuring faked political speech is not 
circulated without disclaimers clearly identifying it as such, like requiring 
campaign finance disclosure, fulfills an important government interest of 
providing accurate information to voters.86  
The Court’s blessing of the information interest should not be overstated. 
The Court has upheld the right to withhold information from voters.87 In each 
case in which the Court has done so—for example, to distribute anonymous 
pamphlets or circulate petitions without disclosing one’s identity—the Court 
carefully struck a balance between general provisions prohibiting all anonymous 
activity versus those prohibiting fraudulent activity, which the Court 
acknowledged a state may (and even should) constitutionally do.88 And, courts 
 
 82. 558 U.S. at 371. 
 83. Id. at 368. 
 84. Of course, the perpetual scourge of so-called dark money often thwarts the goal of informing the public 
about political spending, but the proposition that the state can require disclosure has remained firm. See, e.g., 
Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. Citizens for Responsible Ethics, 135 S. Ct. 5 (2018) (denying stay 
requested to keep identities of donors secret).  
 85. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4168 (1981); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-104 (McKinney 2017); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 12-27-34 (2007). 
 86. As noted above, a disclosure rule (requiring those who circulate counterfeited candidate speech to 
disclose it as such or face penalty) is an alternative to the prohibition/exemption model proposed here. See E-
mail from Professor Marc J. Blitz, supra note 40.  
 87. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995) (“The simple interest in providing 
voters with additional relevant information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or 
disclosures she would otherwise omit.”). 
 88. For example, in McIntyre, the Court distinguished the fraud motive: “The state interest in preventing 
fraud and libel stands on a different footing. We agree with Ohio’s submission that this interest carries special 
weight during election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences 
for the public at large.” Id. at 349. But the Court found that Ohio fraud statutes accomplished this goal 
sufficiently, writing that: 
“Ohio’s prohibition of anonymous leaflets plainly is not its principal weapon against 
fraud. . . . Although these ancillary benefits [of preventing fraud] are assuredly legitimate, we are not 
persuaded that they justify [the statute]’s extremely broad prohibition. As this case demonstrates, the 
prohibition encompasses documents that are not even arguably false or misleading.” 
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struck these laws because either the informational interest was not sufficiently 
strong or the law itself was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to secure that 
interest.89 
C. HARM TO CANDIDATES 
Finally, candidates targeted with counterfeit campaign speech suffer two 
forms of immediate and irremediable harm: diminution of electoral chances and 
reputational harm.  
Victims of counterfeit campaign speech face the possibility of irreparable 
harm to their chances of electoral success.90 Behavioral science teaches that a 
great deal of damage is accomplished through deception; once a person is 
deceived, that damage can be irreversible.91 Commonly referred to as “belief 
perseverance,” it is widely accepted among social scientists that the impact of 
false beliefs, even upon the discovery that the facts upon which those beliefs are 
set are false, is enduring.92 Studies examining the impact of this phenomenon on 
public perceptions of candidates for office holds particularly true.93 Stanford 
political scientist John Bullock’s 2006 study looked at candidate evaluation in a 
U.S. Senate race.94 Subjects were asked to review information about a 
Republican candidate for office and to evaluate that candidate. Then, some 
subjects were told that they were misinformed about that candidate’s positions; 
subjects were told that information about the candidate’s positions had been 
purposely fabricated. Bullock’s study found that subjects, even after being told 
 
Id. at 350–51. 
 89. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (striking a Colorado 
requirement that petition circulators wear badges identifying themselves); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334 (striking 
an Ohio law prohibiting anonymous pamphleteering). 
 90. See infra Subpart V.B (discussing election disruption and legal remedy). 
 91. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson et al., Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in the 
Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL., 1037 (1980) (confirming, 
through a study, that social theories can survive the total discrediting of initial evidential base); Tobias 
Greitemeyer, Article Retracted, but the Message Lives on, 21 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. REV. 557, 557 (2014) 
(confirming, through a study, that “individuals still believe in the findings of an article even though they were 
later told that the data were fabricated and that the article was retracted.”); Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, & Mark 
R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently 
Considered Evidence, 37 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979) (same). 
 92. See generally Anderson et al., supra note 91. Some studies conclude that belief perseverance in the 
political realm is more durable when political preferences are reinforced as opposed to contradicted. See, e.g., 
John G. Bullock, The Enduring Importance of False Political Beliefs (2006) at 3 (noting interesting differences 
between belief perseverance among Democrats versus Republicans).  
 93. See, e.g., Bullock, supra note 92 (noting that most studies of belief perseverance have been resolutely 
apolitical, but here using “real-world cases of political deception and a trio of experiments to demonstrate that 
false beliefs affect people’s political views even after they are understood to be false”); Michael Cobb et al., 
Beliefs Don’t Always Persevere: How Political Figures Are Punished When Positive Information About Them 
Is Discredited, 34 POL. PSYCHOL. 307, 307 (2013) (suggesting that “bogus credit claiming or other positive 
misinformation can have severe repercussions for politicians.”); see also Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First 
Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 898 (2010) (describing the common phenomenon of people believing facts 
even after they are disproved). 
 94. Bullock, supra note 92. 
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that the candidate’s view on education and the environment were fabricated by 
the researchers, continued to think less of the candidate because of those 
stances.95  
These findings underscore that damage to a candidate’s electoral chances 
from counterfeited candidate speech will be real, immediate, and lasting—and 
far more damaging than run-of-the-mill lies and misinformation candidates face 
every day. Candidates (and voters) have come to expect unsavory tactics in 
political campaigning, particularly of late.96 Voters understand they must be 
skeptical and vigilant about being lied to. For candidates (and the news media), 
countering lies in campaigns is standard practice. The harm that counterfeit 
campaign speech imposes is, however, far greater; it is more than false 
insinuation or misrepresentation of a candidate’s views. It is much harder, if not 
impossible, for candidates to overcome these harms through counter speech 
because the voter ingests what appears to be incontrovertible, primary source 
material.97  
A second harm to candidates of counterfeit campaign speech is its attack 
on their basic dignity.98 We have come to accept that running for office in the 
United States results in a loss of personal privacy.99 Candidates recognize that 
they must submit their lives to scrutiny in ways that private citizens do not.100 
Indeed, courts commonly cite this rationale when refusing to protect candidate 
privacy interests.101 Candidates also accept that as a consequence of running, 
lies about them will routinely circulate; campaign resources must be dedicated 
to dispelling them. But by stepping into the lime light, must candidates resign 
 
 95. Id. at 22. 
 96. Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23089, 2017) (describing the rise of “fake news” relating to candidates 
in the 2016 election); see Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, 
Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. OF CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 64–74 
(2017); see also Richard L. Hasen, The 2016 U.S. Voting Wars: From Bad to Worse, 26 WM. & MARY BILL OF 
RTS. J. 629, 629 (2018). 
 97. See infra Subpart IV.B. 
 98. The Supreme Court has been clear that protecting public figures’ dignity cannot alone trump 
constitutional protections. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272–73 (1963) (“Where 
judicial officers are involved, this Court has held that concern for the dignity and reputation of the courts does 
not justify the punishment as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision.” (citing Bridges v. 
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1940))). 
 99. Michelle Obama, BECOMING 252 (2018) (“[The presidential campaign] was like having your soul X-
rayed every day . . . .”); see Frederick Schauer, Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 
293, 300–01 (arguing that the public deserves access to information about candidates for office anyone may find 
relevant—which translates to the public’s right to know everything about candidates). 
 100. Carl M. Cannon, Here We Go Again, 39 NAT’L J. 20, 22 (2007); see also Stanley A. Renshon, THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 320 (1996) (describing general distrust of 
leadership after Watergate era leading to the desire to learn about the private behavior of political leaders). 
 101. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922–23 (Cal. 1969) (“Because of their public 
responsibilities . . . candidates for . . . office have almost always been considered the paradigm case of ‘public 
figures’ who should be subjected to the most thorough scrutiny. In choosing those who are to govern them, the 
public must . . . be afforded the opportunity of learning about any facet of a candidate’s life that may relate to 
his fitness for office.”). 
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themselves to others faking their identities to make authentic-seeming political 
statements in their name without recourse? Should the law rise to protect 
candidates’ rights against counterfeiting of their public identity?  
The impulse to protect candidates’ dignity interest in the face of changing 
technology is nothing new. In the late 1800s, when yellow journalism blossomed 
and instantaneous photography enabled the penny press to widely circulate 
unflattering images and cartoons of politicians, legislators in several states 
passed laws banning the practice, citing just such a dignity interest.102 Indeed, 
when the law of privacy first took root in this country, it arose as a dignity-based 
right.103 In her book on the right of publicity, Jennifer Rothman explains that 
“[f]rom the beginning, courts and commentators referred to a right to control 
‘publicity’ about oneself as central to the right of privacy.”104 As the Georgia 
Supreme Court put it in 1905, “[t]he right of one to exhibit himself to the public 
at all proper times, in all proper places, and in a proper manner is embraced 
within the right of personal liberty.”105 
Writing in the late 1800s, the grandfathers of American privacy law, 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, explicitly exempted candidates for office 
from the privacy protections for which they advocated. They reasoned: 
Peculiarities of manner and person, which in the ordinary individual should be 
free from comment, may acquire a public importance, if found in a candidate for 
public office . . . . To publish of a modest and retiring individual that he suffers 
from an impediment in his speech or that he cannot spell correctly, is an 
unwarranted, if not an unexampled, infringement of his rights, while to state and 
comment on the same characteristics found in a would-be congressman could not 
be regarded as beyond the pale of propriety.106 
It seemed logical to Warren and Brandeis that when individuals put 
themselves before the court of public opinion for purposes of gaining public 
office, the public interest in learning private matters about them overtakes 
privacy interests of candidates.  
But should a dignity-based protection against counterfeited speech be 
entirely unavailable to candidates for public office? The answer has to be no. At 
issue is not whether information about candidates’ speech impediments or 
spelling prowess should be released. In the case of counterfeit campaign speech, 
 
 102. JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 18–19 (2018) (describing one California “anti-
cartoon” statute, passed into law in 1899, which prohibited caricatures of public officials that “reflect[ed] upon 
the honor, integrity, manhood, virtue, reputation, or business or political motives of the person so caricatured, 
or which tend[ed] to expose the individual so caricatured to public hatred, ridicule, or contempt.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). Rothman found “no evidence that the law was ever enforced, and it was quietly 
repealed in 1915.” Id. at 19. 
 103. It is an interest courts still recognize today, particularly in the face of changing technology. Bartnicki 
v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution permits legislatures to 
respond flexibly to the challenges future technology may pose to the individual’s interest in basic personal 
privacy. . . . [W]e should avoid adopting overly broad or rigid constitutional rules, which would unnecessarily 
restrict legislative flexibility.”). 
 104. See ROTHMAN, supra note 102, at 27. 
 105. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905). 
 106. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 215 (1890). 
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the question is whether a candidate’s identity can be manipulated to manufacture 
a speech impediment or spelling ineptness where none exists to inflict political 
harm.107 Warren and Brandeis would surely support law rising to protect 
candidates’ dignity interest against falsifications of their identities.108 
An additional harm is to those who opt not to run in an environment in 
which counterfeit campaign speech is permitted to run rampant. Political 
philosophers and legal scholars have debated whether some measure of 
candidate privacy might be maintained, often citing concerns that total sacrifice 
of privacy will prevent good people from entering the political fray.109 The 
specter of widespread and un-checked counterfeit campaign speech would fuel 
an exodus of well-qualified candidates to the detriment of us all.  
Technology-enabled exposure of our personal identities has prompted 
many scholars to call for legal protections aimed at preserving individual 
dignity. Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Ann Frank, for example, have argued 
that nonconsensual pornography—publishing nude photos of former lovers—is 
an egregious privacy violation.110 Many states since have passed laws banning 
it.111 Candidates for political office will almost inevitably become victims in 
pornographic deep fakes designed to discredit and humiliate.112 Even in non-
pornographic contexts, counterfeit campaign speech involves a form of 
unwelcome exposure that cuts to the core of identity, dignity, and liberty and 
represents a real and recognized harm.  
The Supreme Court has had occasion to examine the nature of harm when 
faked material involves real people. In 2002, the Court took up the issue of 
 
 107. Although, of course, spelling inadequacies are no longer necessarily disqualifying. 
 108. Jennifer Rothman, in her study of the right of publicity, dispels the common misperception that public 
figures cannot recover in right to publicity claims because of a lack of economic harm. Carefully reviewing right 
to publicity cases since they arose in the early 1900s, she concludes that public figures have routinely brought 
successful right to publicity claims based on protecting dignitary interests in their identities. See ROTHMAN, 
supra note 102, at 110 (“Often it is claimed that the right of publicity addresses economic injuries while the right 
of privacy addresses dignitary and emotional distress injuries. As I have revealed, such a division did not exist 
historically, is not enforced today, and makes little sense since injuries from the same harm of misappropriation 
can be economic, dignitary, and emotional.”). 
 109. Scholars like Frederick Schauer argue that, because voters base electoral decisions on different factors, 
the only way to secure an informed citizenry is to set the bar for candidate privacy high. Some voters may care 
if a candidate has been unfaithful to her husband. Some voters may care if a candidate has a history of drug use. 
Some may not. As a result, Schauer argues that all information about candidates is fair game. See Schauer, supra 
note 99, at 908. Some political theorists have resisted this thesis, arguing that candidates should be afforded 
some zone of privacy and forwarding ideas about where the line might be drawn to do so. See generally Dorota 
Mokrosinska, How Much Privacy for Public Officials?, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 181 (Beate Roessler & Dorota Mokrosinka eds., 2015). 
 110. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Ann Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 345, 346 (2014). 
 111. See Mary Ann Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 
1256 (2017) (“As of July 2017, thirty-eight states and Washington, D.C. have passed laws criminalizing 
the nonconsensual distribution of private, sexually explicit images.”). 
 112. See Warzel, supra note 10 (“In the murky corners of the internet, people have begun using machine 
learning algorithms and open-source software to easily create pornographic videos that realistically superimpose 
the faces of celebrities—or anyone for that matter—on the adult actors’ bodies.”). 
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virtual child pornography—images manipulated to appear as if they depict 
minors. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,113 the Court struck down a federal 
law banning virtual child pornography. In that instance, the Court held that the 
First Amendment protects that form of faked speech.114 A big part of the Court’s 
reasoning in striking down the prohibition of virtual child pornography is that 
no child is harmed in its production—the images are fabricated without harming 
real children.115 
The Court did not strike the part of the law that prohibited “computer 
morphing” of innocent pictures of real children into pornographic images. As 
Justice Kennedy described it, “[r]ather than creating original images, 
pornographers can alter innocent pictures of real children so that the children 
appear to be engaged in sexual activity.”116 Plaintiffs in Ashcroft did not 
challenge the prohibition of “morphed” virtual child pornography; the Court did 
not therefore have a reason to rule whether “morphed” images could be 
constitutionally prohibited.117 Justice Kennedy’s mention of the harms 
associated with “morphed images,” however, underscores that there is 
something very different when the underlying image is of real children who 
experience real harm as a result. Counterfeit campaign speech morphs real 
candidate source material; the harm to living, identifiable humans—to 
candidates—is real. 
D. IS COUNTERFEIT CAMPAIGN SPEECH A SOCIAL GOOD? 
Any discussion of harms should balance against possible benefits of 
counterfeited campaign speech. After all, the U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned 
that, “[e]ven a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution 
to public debate, since it brings about ‘the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.’”118 Justice Breyer in 
his Alvarez concurrence noted the many positives of lies.119 Any fan of Art 
 
 113. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 114. The Court found the statute was not sufficiently narrowly tailored in that it captured too much protected 
speech in its ambit. “The First Amendment requires a more precise restriction. For this reason, [the statute at 
issue] is substantially overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment.” Id. at 258. 
 115. Id. at 242 (“Although morphed images may fall within the definition of virtual child pornography, they 
implicate the interests of real children.”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, n. 19 (1963) (quoting John Stuart Mill, ON 
LIBERTY 15 (Alburey Castell ed., 1947)). Although Frederick Schauer points out that “Mill was not to any 
appreciable extent addressing issues of demonstrable and verifiable fact. Instead he was concentrating 
overwhelmingly on what to him were debatable matters of religious, moral, and political truth.” Schauer, supra 
note 93, at 905; see also Jonathan Rauch, KINDLY INQUISITORS: THE NEW ATTACKS ON FREE THOUGHT 49 
(1993) (arguing that no claim, no matter how absurd, should be removed from consideration). 
 119. U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 733 (2012) (noting that “[f]alse factual statements can serve useful 
human objectives, for example: in social contexts, where they may prevent embarrassment, protect privacy, 
shield a person from prejudice, provide the sick with comfort, or preserve a child’s innocence; in public contexts, 
where they may stop a panic or otherwise preserve calm in the face of danger; and even in technical, 
philosophical, and scientific contexts, where (as Socrates’ methods suggest) examination of a false statement 
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Vandalay can relate.120 Could it be that even faked campaign speech has value 
in American political discourse? To this end, when discussing the potential value 
of fake news, Alan Chen posits several intriguing questions: 
What if fake news, like art, music, and other forms of non-propositional 
expression, promote valuable internal, non-cognitive experiences? Not all 
important brain functioning or processing of communication is cognitive, and 
such communication can promote senses of happiness, sadness, anger, wonder, 
and a range of other emotions.
 
In this sense, fake news and political lies might 
have value to their listeners in some of the same ways that music does.121  
What if some listeners, for whatever cognitive reasons, prefer to hear 
digitally doctored candidate speech? Chen suggests some interesting examples. 
When someone buys a National Enquirer, they are looking to be lied to as 
entertainment. When someone pays a fortune teller to tell them what lies ahead, 
they expect the thrill of suggestion, not honesty.122 In both cases, the person has 
reached out to be lied to for entertainment or because the deceptions are in some 
way comforting or fill an emotional need.  
Could the benefits to some voters of filling such a need with counterfeited 
campaign speech outweigh the harms? It is hard to see how. It is not clear, even 
if some voters derive some form of gratification from being exposed to a 
convincing fake, why that preference should be the default.123 In addition, in the 
case of someone who buys a tabloid magazine or hires a fortune teller, that 
person has willingly asked to be duped; at some level they understand that the 
tabloid and psychic are unreliable,124 but nevertheless chose to place some 
measure of blind faith in their prognostications. In the case of counterfeit 
campaign speech, its danger (and power) lies in the fact that the vast majority of 
voters will unknowingly absorb it. By definition, the counterfeiter has created it 
with intent to deceive voters and/or disrupt an election. The same cannot 
generally be said of the staff of the tabloids or a psychic.125 
 
(even if made deliberately to mislead) can promote a form of thought that ultimately helps realize the truth.”); 
see also Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591, 593 (1982) (arguing that 
“the constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one true value . . . ‘individual self-
realization’” which should not be constrained by utilitarian ends like “provid[ing] for participation in 
decisionmaking by all members of society” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 120. See Artemis Vandelay, Art Vandelay, URBAN DICTIONARY (May 18, 2011) 
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Art%20Vandelay. 
 121. Chen, supra note 58 at 21 (citations omitted). Chen continues, “the regulation of fake news could be 
conceptualized in a manner not that different from censoring of art, or a video game, or virtual reality 
experiences, that might create or inspire a different or alternative world view.” Id. For earlier takes, see Helen 
Norton, Lies and the Constitution, SUP. CT. REV. 161, 165 (2012) (noting that lies can “trigger confrontation and 
rebuttal” and “lead to increased public awareness and understanding of the truth . . . .”). 
 122. Chen, supra note 58 at 22–23. 
 123. Unless, perhaps voters are comforted by lies presented as simple solutions to complex problems. Still, 
rhetorical shortcuts and lies-as-grandstanding are qualitatively different from counterfeit campaign speech.  
 124. But see Peter Glick et al., The Fault Is Not in the Stars: Susceptibility of Skeptics and Believers in 
Astrology to the Barnum Effect, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 572, 572 (1989). 
 125. But see Jim Rutenberg et al., Investigators Focus on Another Trump Ally: The National Enquirer, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/us/politics/trump-national-enquirer-american-
media.html. 
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In the end, while there may be arguments for positive contributions of 
faked candidate speech, its harms far outweigh them. As with fraud, 
impersonation, defamation, and other constitutionally-sanctioned restrictions on 
speech, courts must necessarily weigh the potential value of counterfeit 
campaign speech. The balance could well hinge on the facts of specific cases. 
That there exists a tenuous possibility that counterfeit campaign speech has 
negligible value does not negate the very real harms a state may legitimately 
seek to prevent. 
Having surveyed the harms counterfeit campaign speech inflicts, Part III 
addresses whether current law may adequately protect against these harms, 
concluding that it does not. 
III. DO EXISTING LAWS ADDRESS COUNTERFEIT CAMPAIGN SPEECH? 
Federal and state election laws seek to police our system of elections to 
ensure fairness and public confidence in election outcomes.126 Outside the 
election context, state and federal law seeks to prevent fraud and manipulation 
in contexts that could serve to limit or prevent counterfeit campaign speech.127 
This Part reviews both categories of existing law with an eye towards whether it 
can be leveraged to adequately police counterfeit campaign speech. 
A. FEDERAL AND STATE ELECTION LAWS ADDRESSING MISREPRESENTATION 
Among the many shady efforts of Don Segretti to reelect President Nixon 
in 1972,128 he mass-mailed a letter printed on “Citizens for Muskie” stationary 
making it appear as if presidential candidate Edmund Sixtus Muskie was falsely 
accusing Senators Humphrey and Jackson of sexual improprieties.129 The effort 
aimed to purposefully undermine Muskie’s campaign.130 Prosecutors convicted 
Segretti under 18 U.S.C. § 612, which prohibited causing “to be published or 
distributed . . . any . . . statement relating to . . . any person who has publicly 
declared his intention to seek the office of President . . . which does not contain 
the names of the persons, associations, committees, or corporations 
responsible.”131 This federal prohibition on the distribution of anonymous 
campaign literature was an awkward fit. Segretti’s crime was not distributing 
material anonymously—it was distributing forged campaign material.  
Other courts of that era grappled with this mismatch. In People v. Duryea, 
a New York court wrestled with the constitutionality of a state law that required 
 
 126. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 101A (West 1978) (stating that the state’s election laws are 
designed to provide a free and equal election process, while preserving its integrity). 
 127. See infra Subpart III.B. 
 128. Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats, WASH. POST (Oct. 
10, 1972). 
 129. Segretti v. State Bar of Cal., 544 P.2d 929, 931 (Cal. 1976). Senators Humphrey, Jackson, and Muskie 
were all candidates for the Democratic nomination for president. 
 130. “Segretti testified that, when he wrote the letter, it was not his desire to have anyone believe the contents 
thereof and that instead he wanted to create confusion among the candidates.” Id. 
 131. 18 U.S.C. § 612 (1970) (repealed 1976). 
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those circulating political material to include the name and address of the person 
responsible.132 As in the Segretti situation, the offending literature was not 
anonymous, but counterfeit.133 The Duryea court rejected the defendant’s 
argument that they could not be found “factually guilty of non-identification by 
virtue of false identification”134 and found the defendant guilty under New 
York’s anonymity statute.  
After Watergate, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA) to address the political shenanigans of that period.135 While most of the 
focus on FECA (then and today) relates to its campaign finance provisions, part 
of the new law more directly prohibited forgeries of the sort Segretti undertook:  
No person who is a candidate for Federal office or an employee or agent of 
such a candidate shall . . . fraudulently misrepresent himself or any 
committee or organization under his control as speaking or writing or 
otherwise acting for or on behalf of any other candidate or political party or 
employee or agent thereof on a matter which is damaging to such other 
candidate or political party or employee or agent thereof.136 
This post-Watergate reform addresses distribution of forged campaign 
material. Yet it is not clear that it would cover technology-assisted counterfeits 
such as deep fakes. The offense prohibits misrepresentation of oneself (or a 
candidate’s agents), but does not anticipate deep fake counterfeited candidate 
speech.137 In addition, the law does not cover actions of third parties, leaving a 
wide opening for would-be purveyors of counterfeited candidate speech to evade 
prosecution. 
Most state election codes lack explicit prohibitions of deceptive activity 
that would cover counterfeit campaign speech directly.138 Commonly, state 
election codes feature highly-specific bans such as prohibitions on stating 
 
 132. 76 Misc. 2d 948, 951 (1974). 
 133. In this instance, the ruse aimed at getting voters to vote for a third party as a spoiler.  
 134. Duryea, 76 Misc. 2d at 956. The court also rejected the defendant’s follow up argument, that the statute 
violated the First Amendment, noting that “[c]alculated falsehood is never protected by the First Amendment.” 
Id. at 957. The Court later found laws prohibiting anonymous campaign literature unconstitutional in McIntyre 
v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). Until McIntyre, most state codes included requirements 
that political communications include the name of a responsible party. 
 135. S. REP. NO. 93-981, at 564 (1973) (describing the history and purpose of the Federal Election Campaign 
Act). 
 136. 52 U.S.C. § 30124 (2018). Paragraph 2 of this provision provides that “willfully and knowingly 
participat[ing] in or conspir[ing] to participate in any plan, scheme, or design” violates paragraph 1. 
 137. Prosecutions under this law have largely focused on a portion of the law—not excerpted here—relating 
to fraudulent solicitation of funds. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Novacek, 739 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Tex. 
2010) (involving defendant making fraudulent misrepresentations to the general public implying that she was 
raising money for the Republican Party, when in fact she was not). 
 138. California’s election code provides, “[a]ny person who commits fraud or attempts to commit fraud, and 
any person who aids or abets fraud or attempts to aid or abet fraud, in connection with any vote cast, to be cast, 
or attempted to be cast, is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment . . . .” CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18500 (West 
2019). If this prohibition is read broadly, it could capture circulation of counterfeit campaign speech, though 
case law suggests that the statute is primarily intended to punish voter fraud. See Albert-Sheridan v. Spitzer, No. 
G056715, 2018 WL 5023792, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2018) (“The language of this statute is geared toward 
voter fraud in the casting of a ballot, rather than false statements about an electoral opponent at a public forum.”). 
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endorsements falsely,139 misrepresenting the origin of a telephone call,140 or 
misrepresenting a candidate’s voting record,141 none of which would cover 
counterfeited campaign speech unless it related to a prohibited category.  
Section 255.004 of Texas’ election code provides an example of a state 
statute that generally targets misrepresentation of campaign materials’ source. It 
reads: 
(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to injure a candidate or 
influence the result of an election, the person enters into a contract or other 
agreement to print, publish, or broadcast political advertising that purports to 
emanate from a source other than its true source. 
(b) A person commits an offense if, with intent to injure a candidate or 
influence the result of an election, the person knowingly represents in a 
campaign communication that the communication emanates from a source 
other than its true source.142 
Would this statute apply to circulating a deep-faked video of a candidate 
saying something she did not? If the intent of the video was to make it seem as 
if the candidate is the “true source” of the video, perhaps the Texas statute would 
apply. Codified in 1987, the statute most likely targeted labels affixed to 
campaign materials that misrepresented the materials’ source (for example, 
forged letterhead). But the Texas statute is one of the few that would appear to 
have modern application to the problem of counterfeit campaign speech. 
As examined in Part IV below, a common state approach to policing falsity 
in campaigning was to either prohibit anonymity in campaign communications 
(which the Court declared unconstitutional in 1995)143 or to attempt a general 
prohibition of lies in campaigns (a tactic courts have similarly rejected).144 Most 
state election codes, however, do not feature applicable affirmative prohibitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 139. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 20007 (West 2019). 
 140. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 664:14-b. (2010).  
 141. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-131 (2017). 
 142. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West 2019). Alabama’s election code also has a provision that could 
address deep fakery in campaigning:  
It shall be unlawful for any person fraudulently to misrepresent himself or herself, or any other person 
or organization with which he or she is affiliated, as speaking or writing or otherwise acting for or 
on behalf of any candidate, principal campaign committee, political action committee, or political 
party, or agent or employee thereof, in a manner which is damaging or is intended to be damaging to 
such other candidate, principal campaign committee, political action committee, or political party. 
ALA. CODE § 17-5-16(a) (2013). Unlike the federal statute which this law mirrors, it applies to “any person.” 
But it suffers from the same potential shortfall as 52 U.S.C. § 30124 (2018) in that it is rooted in a person 
“misrepresenting himself or herself,” which presumably would not reach attempts to misrepresent the candidate 
through technological means. 
 143. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 144. See infra Subpart IV.B. 
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B. STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS NOT SPECIFIC TO THE ELECTION CONTEXT 
THAT MIGHT ADDRESS COUNTERFEIT CAMPAIGN SPEECH 
If a perpetrator hacked a candidate’s Twitter account and posted faked 
Tweets, the candidate may have recourse under state and federal anti-hacking 
statutes (depending on the facts).145 Corporate policy might also prevent fakes. 
For example, Twitter’s terms of service (“TOS”) prohibit impersonation.146 Yet 
anti-hacking laws and corporate TOS agreements do not go far enough to 
address the problem of counterfeit campaign speech.147 First, the jury is still out 
on whether private companies are up to the task of self-policing.148 Second, 
perpetrators do not necessarily need to hack or employ private networks to 
obtain what they need to create and distribute faked candidate speech; they may 
obtain publicly-available source material and alter and disseminate it through 
perfectly legal means. 
Do state and federal laws prohibiting identity theft address counterfeit 
campaign speech? Identity theft involves a defendant who wrongfully obtains 
and uses another person’s personal data to perpetrate a fraud or deception. 
Statutes targeting the use of personal data generally target misuse of credit card 
data or personal identifiers like Social Security Numbers, birth dates, or drivers’ 
license numbers.149 Using digital material from, for example, a series of videos 
of a candidate, would likely fall outside most statutory language, at least as 
currently formulated. In addition, laws protecting against identity theft typically 
 
 145. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2012), and its state equivalents criminalize 
gaining unauthorized access (or access that exceeds authorization) to computers. Some state computer fraud 
statutes appear to come close. For example, Kansas’s computer crime statute makes it unlawful to “use a 
computer, computer system, computer network or any other property for the purpose of devising or executing a 
scheme or artifice with the intent to defraud or to obtain money, property, services or any other thing of value 
by means of false or fraudulent pretense or representation.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5839(a)(2) (2012). It is 
unclear whether this statute would reach counterfeit campaign speech, particularly because of its focus on the 
purpose of the fraud as obtaining a thing of value, i.e., financial gain, which does not map easily onto the 
campaign context.  
 146. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 5, at 56 (“TOS agreements . . . will be primary battlegrounds in the 
fight to minimize the harms that deep fakes may cause.”); see also Impersonation Policy, TWITTER, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-impersonation-policy (last visited July 27, 2019). Before 
the 2018 midterms, Facebook’s policy seemed unprepared for the task of ferreting out impersonators. See 
William Turton, We Posed as 100 Senators to Run Ads on Facebook. Facebook approved All of Them, VICE 
NEWS (Oct. 30, 2018), https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/xw9n3q/we-posed-as-100-senators-to-run-ads-on-
facebook-facebook-approved-all-of-them. 
 147. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 5, at 57 (noting that Twitter has long banned impersonation on its 
platform and that Google’s corporate policy has taken steps to prevent faked speech). 
 148. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Gabriel J.X. Dance, On Social Media, Lax Enforcement Lets Impostor 
Accounts Thrive, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/technology/social-media-
impostor-accounts.html (describing shortcomings of private sector efforts to combat imposters on social 
networking sites).  
 149. The Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act of 1998 (“ITADA”) was the first federal statute to 
define identity theft as a stand-alone crime. The ITADA defines identity theft as “knowingly transfer[ring], 
possess[ing], or us[ing], without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to 
commit, or to aid or abet . . . any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes 
a felony under any applicable State or local law.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2012) (emphasis added). 
H - GREEN_22 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019  6:35 PM 
August 2019] COUNTERFEIT CAMPAIGN SPEECH 1473 
require plaintiffs to demonstrate financial harm.150 They are not intended, at least 
in their current iterations, to address the stealing of one’s political identity.151  
Could anti-cyberstalking statutes provide a means of redress? A federal 
anti-cyberstalking statute makes it a crime to use an “interactive computer 
service or electronic communication service” to intimidate a person in ways 
“reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress.”152 In their 
analysis of whether such laws might address the problem of deep fakes, Danielle 
Citron and Bobby Chesney suggest that, in certain circumstances, such 
provisions could provide redress.153 But cyberstalking statutes are an awkward 
fit as applied to counterfeited candidate speech. Most counterfeit campaign 
 
 150. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-3-54 (2018) (“Any person who knowingly takes the name, birth date, 
social security number, or other identifying information of another person . . . for the purpose of making 
financial or credit transactions in the other person’s name, or for the purpose of gaining employment, is guilty 
of a felony.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-129a(a) (2018) (“[a] person commits identity theft when such person 
knowingly uses personal identifying information of another person to obtain or attempt to obtain money, credit, 
goods, services, property or medical information without the consent of such other person.”); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 530.5-530.55(a) (West 2019) (“Every person who willfully obtains personal identifying 
information . . . of another person, and uses that information for any unlawful purpose, including to obtain, or 
attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, real property, or medical information without the consent of that 
person.”). Some states have “imposter” statutes that could be leveraged to address counterfeit campaign speech. 
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-24.1(A) (West 2009) (prohibiting theft of identity which “consists of 
willfully obtaining, recording or transferring personal identifying information of another person without the 
authorization or consent of that person and with the intent to defraud that person or another or with the intent to 
sell or distribute the information to another for an illegal purpose.”). This language could be leveraged against 
perpetrators of counterfeit campaign speech. For a full listing of state identity fraud and impersonation statutes, 
see Identity Theft, NCSL: NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-
services-and-commerce/identity-theft-state-statutes.aspx (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 151. Part of the reason is that U.S. imposter and identity theft laws evolved to address questions of liability 
and fraud against the government, not to address fraud perpetrated in the political sphere. See Jennifer Trost, The 
Impostor Rule and Identity Theft in America, 35 LAW & HIST. REV. 433, 435 (2017) (“Impersonation and then 
identity theft emerged in the space between a civil system preoccupied with moving money and determining 
allocation for losses incurred by impostors, and a later-developing criminal system preoccupied with fraud or 
forgery against the government.”). Some related statutes may address some parts of the problem. For example, 
a federal regulation prohibits transmitting inaccurate or misleading caller identification information. 47 
C.F.R. § 64.1604 (2011). If a scheme to digitally impersonate a candidate included use of a misleading caller 
ID, this law would presumably apply (though there is some question because the law prohibits scams that seek 
to obtain “anything of value”). In any case, the prohibition does not reach the digital impersonation itself, nor 
does it touch schemes that do not involve caller identification. For more, see Maureen Groppe, How Unsolicited 
Text Messages Were Sent to Hoosiers to Put Pressure on Sen. Joe Donnelly, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (July 13, 2018), 
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2018/07/13/do-texts-pressuring-joe-donnelly-support-brett-
kavanaugh-comply-federal-rules/782090002/; see also Kevin Roose & Mitchell Ferman, ‘Impostor’ Sent Texts 
to Beto O’Rourke Supporters, Campaign Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/09/05/us/politics/beto-orourke-texts-voting-texas.html (describing faked tweets from a U.S. Senate 
candidate in Texas). 
 152. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2018). 
 153. Chesney & Citron, supra note 5, at 43 (describing penalties defendants face under federal anti-
cyberstalking law and suggesting that “[s]ome deep fakes will fit [the] bill.”). 
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speech will not resemble “stalking” in the conventional sense, to the extent the 
motive is to destabilize elections.154 
What about state rules prohibiting impersonation? Many states have laws, 
for example, prohibiting impersonation of public servants and police officers.155 
In United States v. Chappell,156 a former Fairfax County Sherriff’s Office 
employee falsely claimed he was still a police officer in order to avoid a speeding 
ticket. Prosecuted under Virginia’s statute prohibiting impersonation of a police 
officer, the defendant raised the argument that the First Amendment protected 
his lie.157 The Fourth Circuit was unimpressed: “[T]he Virginia impersonation 
statute has a plainly legitimate sweep. By protecting unsuspecting citizens from 
those who falsely pretend to be law enforcement officers, the statute serves the 
Commonwealth’s critical interest in public safety.”158 
Some states criminalize online impersonation. In Texas for example, it is a 
felony to create a website on a social networking site using the name or persona 
of another with the intent to harm, defraud, intimidate or threaten.159 Texas also 
prohibits sending an email, instant message, or text claiming to be another 
person, without his or her permission, if the intent is to harm or defraud.160 
Currently only a few states have such laws,161 but they could provide a hook for 
addressing some forms of counterfeit campaign speech—that is, if such laws are 
not found to violate perpetrators’ First Amendment rights.  
 
 154. See Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 373, 374–75 (2009) (describing the more typical, often gendered forms of cyberstalking and 
cyberharassment that such laws aim to prevent). 
 155. See, e.g., New York statute criminally prohibits impersonation of a public servant. See N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 2018) (stating that criminal liability for impersonating “another by communication 
by internet website or electronic means with intent to obtain a benefit or injure or defraud another, or by such 
communication [pretend] to be a public servant in order to induce another to submit to such authority or act in 
reliance on such pretense.”). Federal law also prohibits impersonating a public servant. See 25 
C.F.R. § 11.432 (2017) (“A person commits a misdemeanor if he or she falsely pretends to hold a position in 
the public service with purpose to induce another to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise to 
act in reliance upon that pretense to his or her prejudice.”). 
 156. United States v. Chappell, 691 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1136 (2013). 
 157. The defendant argued the statute facially violated the First Amendment because it “criminalizes the 
behavior of adults who attend costume parties dressed as a police officer, children playing cops and robbers, and 
actors portraying law enforcement officials.” Id. at 393. 
 158. Id. at 392. Notably, the Fourth Circuit reached its decision post-Alvarez, noting that all nine justices in 
Alvarez “affirmed that the federal officer impersonation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 912, is constitutional.” Id. at 394.  
 159. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07(a)(1) (West 2011). 
 160. Id. at § 33.07(a)(2). 
 161. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.6(1) (2008) (“A person commits the offense of harassment by 
impersonation if that person poses as another person, without the express authorization of that person, and makes 
or causes to be made, either directly or indirectly, a transmission of any personal information of the person to 
another by any oral statement, any written statement, or any statement conveyed by any electronic means, with 
the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm any person.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25 (McKinney 2018) (stating that 
criminal impersonation in the second degree, occurs if a person “[i]mpersonates another and does an act in such 
assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another . . . .”). Section 190.25 of the 
New York Penal Code was challenged and upheld in Golb v. Att’y Gen. of New York. 870 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 
2017). 
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In 2014, prosecutors indicted Billy Mack Maddison under Texas’ criminal 
impersonation statute for using nude photographs of his ex-wife to create 
Facebook profiles in her name and sending friend requests to her friends and 
family. Maddison challenged the statute as a facial First Amendment violation. 
The trial court agreed it was.162 But in Ex parte Maddison, the appellate court 
reversed, finding that the defendant’s actions fell “within the categories of 
criminal, fraudulent, and tortious activity that are unprotected by the First 
Amendment.”163 
Which brings us to tort. Do tort claims, like defamation,164 false light,165 or 
the right of publicity,166 offer candidates adequate means of addressing 
counterfeit campaign speech? The short answer is that they might.167 But there 
are real barriers to expecting individual plaintiffs to police counterfeited 
candidate speech effectively through civil tort suits, particularly in the election 
context.168 For one, candidates may not have the resources or ability to identify 
 
 162. See Tommy Witherspoon, Waco Judge Rules Texas Online Impersonation Law Unconstitutional, 
Violates First Amendment, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.wacotrib.com/ 
news/courts_and_trials/waco-judge-rules-texas-online-impersonation-law-unconstitutional-violates-
first/article_d633811c-86d0-5dce-a3f5-924ff6591ba0.html (describing the ruling that the law used to prosecute 
defendant for using “the name of his ex-wife to create a Facebook profile ‘with the intent to harm or defraud or 
intimidate or threaten’ her” violated the First Amendment). 
 163. Ex parte Maddison, 518 S.W.3d 630, 638 (Tex. App. 2017). 
 164. Generally, to prove a defamation claims, a plaintiff must show a false or defamatory statement 
concerning another published to a third party and damage caused to the person who is the subject of the 
statement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). In the case of a non-public 
figure, the plaintiff must prove negligence, whereas public officials (like candidates for office) must prove the 
defendant acted with actual malice. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (establishing the 
actual malice standard for public officials in defamation claims).  
 165. To bring a false light claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant published information about the 
plaintiff portraying the plaintiff in a false or misleading light with reckless disregard for its falsity. That 
information must be highly offensive or embarrassing to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 166. When William Prosser categorized the right of publicity as one of four privacy torts, he described the 
right of publicity as appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of plaintiff’s name or likeness. Neil M. 
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1888–90 (2010); 
see ROTHMAN, supra note 102 (describing the historical and current contours of the tort). Since its inception, the 
publicity tort seeks to address attacks on dignity, which counterfeit campaign speech undoubtedly is. Jennifer 
Rothman addresses the misperception that the harm must be pecuniary for right of publicity plaintiffs to recover 
in right of publicity claims. See infra Subpart IV.A. That said, some state right of publicity laws, like California’s 
misappropriation of likeness statute, require a commercial element, which would not be present in cases of 
counterfeited candidate speech. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1984) (providing that defendant must 
knowingly use the plaintiff’s photograph or likeness, without consent, “for purposes of advertising or 
selling . . . goods or services.”). 
 167. For a thoughtful discussion of the viability of tort remedies for deep fakes generally, see Chesney & 
Citron, supra note 5, at 34–41. The authors review liability of individuals as well as platforms hosting deep 
fakes. On individual liability, the authors suggest that right of publicity, defamation, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress are all possible tort claims to address deep fakes. They review the many hurdles to such civil 
claims (finding the perpetrator, time and expense, etc.). On platform liability, the authors discuss the problem of 
immunity under the Communications Decency Act § 230 (47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2012)), and suggest such 
immunity should be curtailed to constrain malicious deep fakes.  
 168. Defamation may also be an uncomfortable fit. In the case of a deep fake, the false statement at issue is 
not uttered by a defendant—it is digitally-uttered by the plaintiff herself. In addition, the counterfeited candidate 
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perpetrators. Technology enables anonymous actions by domestic and 
international actors that frustrate would-be plaintiffs from securing remedies.169 
For another, tort claims are expensive to bring and can take months, if not years, 
to resolve, rendering them an ineffective means of addressing election 
disruption.170 And finally, First Amendment protections, as discussed in the next 
Part, could bar recovery in tort given the high bar for restraints on political 
discourse.171 
IV. DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT SHIELD COUNTERFEIT CAMPAIGN 
SPEECH AGAINST LAWS THAT WOULD RESTRICT IT? 
Before 2012, courts issued highly splintered opinions on whether or not 
lying in campaigns can constitutionally be prohibited.172 In 2012, the U.S. 
Supreme Court signaled a death knell for curbing lying in campaigns in United 
States v. Alvarez.173 In Alvarez, the Court found unconstitutional a law 
prohibiting lying about receiving military honors.174 In ruling against the law, a 
majority of justices worried that the statute had the potential to criminalize too 
much speech—that it was not sufficiently tailored to address the problem it 
targeted. Writing for the plurality, Justice Kennedy suggested that a better 
solution to policing lies about military honors would be for the state to publish 
a database of who has received them.175 So long as the public has access to the 
truth, Kennedy reasoned, lies can easily be disproven (and would-be liars 
deterred by the ease with which we can expose their lying ways).176 
 
speech may raise the candidate’s reputation in the eyes of some. In a highly-polarized political context, half of 
voters might like the counterfeit speech better than the candidate’s real views, making damage to reputation 
harder to prove. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“A communication 
to be defamatory need not tend to prejudice the other in the eyes of everyone in the community or of all of his 
associates, nor even in the eyes of a majority of them. It is enough that the communication would tend to 
prejudice him in the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority of them, and that it is made to one or more of 
them or in a manner that makes it proper to assume that it will reach them. On the other hand, it is not enough 
that the communication would be derogatory in the view of a single individual or a very small group of 
persons.”). First Amendment sanctity of political speech protects most defamers in this realm. Defamation may 
deter certain forms of counterfeit campaign speech (assuming it applies), but in the case of those running for 
office, most courts have concluded that the best cure for defamed political candidates is counter speech. 
 169. Chesney & Citron provide an in-depth analysis of problems plaintiffs face in pursuing tort claims. See 
Chesney & Citron, supra note 5, at 34. 
 170. For discussion of election disruption and timing of legal remedies, see infra Subpart V.B. 
 171. See generally Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (protecting false statements made by the press 
on First Amendment grounds). 
 172. Hasen, supra note 14, at 56 (“For many years, courts have divided on the constitutionality of laws 
regulating false campaign speech, with some courts upholding some false campaign speech laws and other courts 
striking them down.”). 
 173. States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 729 (“There is, however, at least one less speech-restrictive means by which the Government 
could likely protect the integrity of the military awards system. A Government-created database could list 
Congressional Medal of Honor recipients. Were a database accessible through the Internet, it would be easy to 
verify and expose false claims.”). 
 176. Id.  
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Counterfeit campaign speech is distinct from the problem in Alvarez. It 
involves attempts to manipulate or otherwise falsify source material emanating 
from political candidates. It would be as if, instead of merely bragging about 
accolades he did not receive, Mr. Alvarez were able to add his name to the 
official database of military honorees. Laws prohibiting Mr. Alvarez from doing 
so must be constitutional, as Mr. Alvarez does not have a First Amendment right 
to falsify the record.  
Counterfeit campaign speech is different than a lie: it threatens to wreak 
havoc on political discourse and denies the public the ability to ascertain the 
truth about political candidates by manipulating the source material used to 
judge them. Counterfeit campaign speech doesn’t just distort democratic 
political discourse about candidates for public office, it pulls the rug out from 
underneath it. The question remains, however, whether this distinction would 
exempt a ban on counterfeit campaign speech from First Amendment protection.  
A. LIES AND POLITICAL SPEECH PRE-ALVAREZ 
American law exempts certain kinds of speech from First Amendment 
coverage, permitting laws that curb speech in defined circumstances. Trademark 
law provides a good example. If an infringer produces an advertisement using a 
trademark holder’s slogan, trademark law enables the holder to pursue damages 
against the infringing use.177 The First Amendment does not protect the 
trademark abuser’s use of the slogan. Defamation, fraud, and perjury are 
additional examples of First Amendment-sanctioned speech prohibitions.178  
The Court (rightly) sets a high bar for core political speech.179 Assessing 
fraud in the context of political discourse—as opposed to speech squarely in the 
commercial realm like trademark—is, therefore, a delicate task. To understand 
how the Court might approach the constitutionality of a ban on counterfeit 
campaign speech, this Subpart turns first to the history of courts’ policing of 
prohibitions on deception in campaigning. 
The idea that prohibiting false campaign speech is constitutional seemed 
plausible when the Supreme Court first examined the issue, though indirectly, 
in a case called Brown v. Hartlage in 1982.180 That case involved a Kentucky 
candidate who exclaimed during a candidate speech that he would lower his 
official salary if elected to save taxpayer money.181 This declaration allegedly 
ran afoul of the state’s Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibited candidates from 
“making [an] expenditure, loan, promise, agreement, or contract as to action 
 
 177. But see Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 
381 (2008) (arguing that more courts should subject trademarks to First Amendment scrutiny). 
 178. See supra Part II. 
 179. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee has its fullest 
and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”); Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange 
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”). 
 180. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982). 
 181. Id. at 47–48. 
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when elected, in consideration for vote.”182 While the law did not prohibit lying 
in campaigns, it sought to limit candidate speech, prompting the Court to 
consider whether campaign speech could be constitutionally constrained.183 
The Court acknowledged that the state has a “legitimate interest in 
upholding the integrity of the electoral process itself,” but noted that First 
Amendment protections are at their pinnacle when it comes to protecting speech 
at the “heart of American constitutional democracy—the political campaign.”184 
The Court required that the state proffer a compelling interest in restricting 
campaign speech.185 In the course of concluding that the state’s asserted interest 
in this instance did not make the cut, the Hartlage Court warned against attempts 
to regulate campaign speech:  
In barring certain public statements . . . the State ban runs directly contrary to 
the fundamental premises underlying the First Amendment as the guardian of 
our democracy. That Amendment embodies our trust in the free exchange of 
ideas as the means by which the people are to choose between good ideas and 
bad, and between candidates for political office. The State’s fear that voters 
might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling 
justification for limiting speech.186  
Hartlage did not address whether a state could bar false campaign speech. 
Indeed, the Court seemed to take that assumption as given. Citing defamation 
principles, the Court acknowledged that “demonstrable falsehoods are not 
protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.”187 
Using the defamation frame, the Court found dispositive that there had been no 
showing that the candidate made the disputed statement in bad faith or that he 
made the statement with reckless disregard as to its falsity.188  
This opening in Hartlage suggested that laws barring lying in campaigns 
were constitutional. States have attempted various prohibitions of lying in 
political campaigns, many of which have been subject to constitutional 
challenges.189 A Washington state statute, for example, prohibited the 
sponsorship with actual malice of political advertising that contained a false 
statement of material fact.190 The Washington Supreme Court struck down the 
 
 182. Id. at 49. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 52–53.  
 185. Id. at 53–54 (“[W]hen a State seeks to restrict directly the offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters, 
the First Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by not only a legitimate state 
interest, but a compelling one, and that the restriction operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected 
expression.”). 
 186. Id. at 60. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 61. 
 189. See infra note 221. 
 190. The law also prohibited political advertising that falsely represented that a candidate is an incumbent 
for the office sought, or directly or indirectly, falsely claimed the support or endorsement of any person or 
organization when in fact the candidate does not have such support or endorsement. WASH. REV. 
CODE § 42.17.530(1)(a) (2012). 
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law in State ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote No! Committee.191 
Wrestling with whether false political speech could be constitutionally 
prohibited, 119 Vote No! involved a political advertisement opposing a ballot 
initiative.192 The ad at issue suggested that, if it passed, the law would invite 
assisted suicide without adequate safeguards.193 The state filed a complaint 
alleging that the advertisement violated the Washington statute.194  
A sharply divided court issued four separate opinions. A majority of 
justices found that the Washington statute prohibiting lies in campaigns violated 
the First Amendment on its face.195 The majority found the state lacked a 
compelling interest in preventing lies in the course of an initiative or referendum 
campaign.196 The majority made a distinction between speech about ballot 
measures versus candidates, suggesting (with a nod to defamation law) that a 
narrower law banning malicious lies about political candidates could survive 
constitutional scrutiny.197 
The majority’s decision was animated by age-old American distrust of the 
state’s ability to determine “truth,”198 here with respect to the advertisement in 
question.199 Whether or not the proposed legislation contained adequate 
safeguards for assisted suicide was up for debate; government-decreed truth or 
falsity felt “patronizing and paternalistic.”200 The majority believed the solution 
to be more speech to help the public weigh the issue.201  
 
 191. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 695–99 (Wash. 1998). 
 192. Id. at 693–94. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 699 (“We therefore conclude [the statute] chills political speech, usurps the rights of the electorate 
to determine the merits of political initiatives without fear of government sanction, and lacks a compelling state 
interest in justification.”). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Citing defamation law in her concurring opinion, Justice Madsen explained that “[a] state . . . may 
allow recovery of damages for defamation to . . . candidates for public office, provided that the New York Times 
[v. Sullivan] actual malice standard is satisfied.” Id. at 700. Professor Charles Fried takes a similar, if not more 
restrictive, view. He has suggested confining allowable prohibitions to a narrow class of defamatory speech 
when it comes to political speech. According to Fried, “the First Amendment precludes punishment for 
generalized ‘public’ frauds, deceptions and defamation. In political campaigns the grossest misstatements, 
deceptions, and defamations are immune from legal sanction unless they violate private rights—that is, unless 
individuals are defamed.” Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 225, 238 (1992). 
 198. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 695. 
 199. Id. (“The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a 
guardianship of the public mind . . . . In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the 
forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.” (quoting Grant v. Meyer, 828 
F.2d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The 8th Circuit adopted this view in 281 
Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 635 n.3 (8th Cir. 2011).  
 200. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 698. 
 201. The fallback position that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.” Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). More recently, scholars have begun to question whether the 
concept of more speech curing harm works in the Internet Age. See Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: 
Towards a Better Theory for Platform Governance, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM, 337, 342 (2017) (“The internet—
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Justice Talmadge, joined by one other Justice, wrote a fiery concurring 
opinion, agreeing only that the group did not violate the law, but not agreeing 
that the law was unconstitutional.202 Justice Talmadge lambasted the majority 
for being the “first court in the history of the Republic to declare First 
Amendment protection for calculated lies.”203 Justice Talmadge wrote: 
The majority . . . presumes the people of Washington have no authority to require 
persons to tell the truth. This presumption is, of course, wrong. Perjury has been 
a part of Washington’s criminal code since territorial days. Prohibitions against 
lying and bearing false witness may be found in cultures worldwide from time 
immemorial.204  
Justice Talmadge took issue with the notion that lies could not be 
prohibited in the political sphere. Instead, he argued that the state had an 
important interest in affirmatively prohibiting deception in this realm: 
That speech is used as a tool for political ends does not automatically bring it 
under the protective mantle of the Constitution. For the use of the known lie as a 
tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the 
orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be 
effected.205  
After this set of conflicted opinions about whether political lies can be 
constitutionally prohibited, the question came to head (though again not in the 
campaign speech context) in United States v. Alvarez, decided in 2012.206  
B. ALVAREZ AND ITS AFTERMATH  
Like the Washington state case, the U.S. Supreme Court issued splintered 
opinions, voting 6-3 that the Stolen Valor Act was not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored.207 In Alvarez, the Justices discussed the problem of lying in campaigns. 
Thus, it is instructive for discerning how the court would rule on a prohibition 
of counterfeit campaign speech.  
Four Justices—Kennedy, Roberts, Sotomayor and Ginsburg—held that 
lies are constitutionally protected under a strict scrutiny standard requiring any 
 
replete with scatological jokes and Prince cover songs—involves much more than political deliberation. And so 
any theory of speech that focuses only on political outcomes [for example., that the marketplace of ideas cures 
false speech] will fail because it cannot fully capture what actually happens on the internet.”). 
 202. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 701. 
 203. Id. (emphasis added). Talmadge quoted Justice Brennan, who wrote, “the knowingly false statement 
and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.” Id. at 
703 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)). Justice Talmadge went on to reference Supreme 
Court opinions with language supportive of this idea: “Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially 
advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.” Id. at 697 (citing 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). The court continued: “Of course, demonstrable 
falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.” Id. at 703 
(citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 59 (1982)). 
 204. Id. at 702. 
 205. Id. at 703 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
 206. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 207. Id. at 738 (“And so it is likely that a more narrowly tailored statute combined with such information-
disseminating devices will effectively serve Congress’ end.”). 
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prohibition to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.208 
All four Justices acknowledged that such First Amendment protections would 
not apply to categories of punishable lies like defamation, perjury, or fraud.209 
Two Justices, Kagan and Breyer, would apply “intermediate scrutiny” in which 
the government would have a lighter burden of proving its prohibition served an 
important government interest.210  
Though these six Justices disagreed as to the level of scrutiny to apply, all 
six supported the contention that “falsity alone may not suffice to bring the 
speech outside the First Amendment.”211 It must be accompanied by an 
identified harm.212 As Justice Breyer framed it, only narrow prohibitions on false 
speech could survive constitutional scrutiny upon “proof of specific harm to 
identifiable victims” or instances in which a “particular and specific harm by 
interfering with the functioning of a government department” could be shown.213 
Justice Breyer settled on statutes that prohibit trademark infringement as what 
he called “the closest analogy” to lying about receiving a military honor: 
Trademarks identify the source of a good; and infringement causes harm by 
causing confusion among potential customers (about the source) and thereby 
diluting the value of the mark to its owner, to consumers, and to the economy. 
Similarly, a false claim of possession of a medal or other honor creates confusion 
about who is entitled to wear it, thus diluting its value to those who have earned 
it, to their families, and to their country.214 
But Breyer distinguished trademark law from the Stolen Valor prohibition 
by noting that trademark law is narrower: it requires a showing of commercial 
harm.215 
Justice Alito, joined by Scalia and Thomas, dissented, siding with Justice 
Talmadge in denying that false statements have “intrinsic First Amendment 
value.”216 Justice Alito noted that the sale and manufacture of counterfeit 
military decorations is constitutionally prohibited,217 and also took up the 
 
 208. Id. at 710. 
 209. Id. at 736 (“[I]n virtually all these instances . . . requirements of proof of injury . . . narrow the statute 
to a subset of lies where specific harm is more likely to occur. The limitations help to make certain that the 
statute does not allow its threat of liability or criminal punishment to roam at large, discouraging or forbidding 
the telling of the lie in contexts where harm is unlikely or the need for the prohibition is small.”) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 210. Id. at 732 (Breyer, J., concurring). Even under this lower standard, Kagan and Breyer found the 
government’s justification for banning lies about military awards lacking. Id. at 739. (“The Government has 
provided no convincing explanation as to why a more finely tailored statute would not work. In my own view, 
such a statute could significantly reduce the threat of First Amendment harm while permitting the statute to 
achieve its important protective objective.”). 
 211. Id. at 719. 
 212. Id. at 720 (“Perjured testimony ‘is at war with justice’ because it can cause a court to render a ‘judgment 
not resting on truth.’” (quoting In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945)). 
 213. Id. at 734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 214. Id. at 735 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. at 746 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 217. Id. at 741 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61 (1970) (upholding on 
its face, a federal statute that makes it a crime to wear a United States military uniform without authorization)). 
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trademark analogy. He pointed out that trademark law rests on the principle that 
trademark owners have the right to exclusive profit of their mark and the public 
has the right to rely on the mark as a signal of the genuineness of the product.218 
Justices Alito and Breyer recognized the importance of protecting the public 
from fakes.  
Justice Alito focused on harm caused when individuals forward false 
claims about military honors by, for example, defrauding the government out of 
veterans’ benefits or securing government contracts through fraud.219 Justice 
Alito pointed to a litany of federal laws that make it a crime to present false 
information to government agencies to prevent specific harms.220 
Since Alvarez, courts have applied its reasoning to state statutes prohibiting 
lying in campaigns.221 For example, in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,222 the 
Sixth Circuit struck an Ohio law prohibiting false statements “during the course 
of any campaign for nomination or election to public office or office of a 
political party.”223 In SBA List, an anti-choice organization wanted to post 
language on a billboard suggesting that a candidate who voted for the Affordable 
Care Act had in fact “vot[ed] for ‘taxpayer-funded abortion.’”224 When the 
candidate’s attorneys threatened legal action citing the Ohio statute, the 
billboard company refused to post the group’s advertisement.225 SBA List sued, 
arguing that Ohio’s statute violated its First Amendment rights.226 SBA List 
faced difficult Sixth Circuit precedent in Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission, 
which had upheld Ohio’s political false statements laws as constitutional.227 
 
 218. Id. at 743 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 
30 J. LAW & ECON. 265, 308 (1987)). The Court does not always dismiss First Amendment implications of 
trademark law. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (holding that the disparagement clause of Lanham 
Act, prohibiting federal trademark registration for marks that might disparage any persons, living or dead, was 
facially invalid under First Amendment protection of speech).  
 219. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 742–43. 
 220. Id. at 747–48 (“[I]t has long been assumed that the First Amendment is not offended by prominent 
criminal statutes with no close common-law analog. The most well known of these is probably 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 
which makes it a crime to ‘knowingly and willfully’ make any ‘materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or representation’ in ‘any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch 
of the Government of the United States.’ Unlike perjury, § 1001 is not limited to statements made under oath or 
before an official government tribunal. Nor does it require any showing of ‘pecuniary or property loss to the 
government.’ Instead, the statute is based on the need to protect ‘agencies from the perversion which might result 
from the deceptive practices described.’” (citations omitted)). 
 221. See, e.g., 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 785 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1550 
(2015) (“[N]o amount of narrow tailoring succeeds because [Minnesota’s political false-statements law] is not 
necessary, is simultaneously overbroad and underinclusive, and is not the least restrictive means of achieving 
any stated goal.”); Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1257 (Mass. 2015) (striking down a similar 
Massachusetts law); see also Rickert v. State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 829–31 (Wash. 
2007) (striking down Washington’s political false-statements law, which required proof of actual malice, but not 
defamatory nature). 
 222. 814 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 223. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21(B) (West 1995). 
 224. Susan B. Anthony List, 814 F.3d at 470 (emphasis added).  
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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Pestrak held that “false speech, even political speech, does not merit 
constitutional protection if the speaker knows of the falsehood or recklessly 
disregards the truth.”228  
But citing Alvarez, a unanimous Sixth Circuit held that the law was not 
sufficiently narrowly tailored.229 The court found that Alvarez distinguished 
cases upon which the Pestrak lower court had relied.230 Namely, those cases had 
not depended solely on the falsity of the statements made.231 Instead, the Sixth 
Circuit also focused on harm, reasoning that those cases relied on prohibitions 
of false speech that was also defamatory, fraudulent, or caused some other 
“legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement, such as an invasion 
of privacy or the costs of vexatious litigation.”232 The ad at issue in SBA List was 
not fraudulent; it was attacked only for its alleged falsity. SBA List drove home 
the central lesson in Alvarez: falsity cannot be the sole driver of a law prohibiting 
lies in campaigns. Thus, to survive constitutional scrutiny, a prohibition of 
deceptions in campaigns must target (1) a narrow subset of speech that (2) causes 
specific and identifiable harm.233 
C. A NARROW COUNTERFEIT CAMPAIGN SPEECH PROHIBITION 
Turning to the question of First Amendment protections for counterfeit 
campaign speech post-Alvarez, a threshold question is whether the First 
Amendment protects it at all. 234 Unlike garden-variety political lies—lies about 
political opponents’ positions or love lives—the truth of which may be subject 
to honest discourse or debate—counterfeit campaign speech is, by definition, a 
knowing fraud. To prosecute, an official or court need not figure out whether the 
content is true or false (a task that begs selective prosecution and manipulation 
for partisan ends).235 Rather, the question is whether the material is faked with 
intent to confuse voters and distort democracy.236 Just like Justice Alito’s 
 
 228. Id. at 577. 
 229. Susan B. Anthony List, 814 F.3d at 476. 
 230. Id. at 471 (stating that “the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Alvarez most clearly 
abrogates Pestrak ’s reasoning.” (citations omitted)). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 472 (citing Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719). 
 233. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 734 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 234. Frederick Schauer takes issue with whether demonstrably false speech is even relevant to First 
Amendment questions. See Schauer, supra note 93, at 908 (“[D]emonstrable factual falsity, whether public or 
private, is simply not the same subject as that of free speech and the First Amendment.”) Chen and Marceaux 
suggest that lies can be placed according to a spectrum of harm: “On one end of the spectrum are lies such as 
perjury and fraud, which fall beyond the First Amendment’s reach because they are widely and historically 
understood to cause tangible harm, material gain, or both.” Alan K. Chen & Justice Marceau, Developing a 
Taxonomy of Lies under the First Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 658 (2018). At the other end of the 
spectrum are what Chen and Marceaux refer to as “high value” lies, which they describe as lies told to uncover 
truth, for example by investigative journalists who disguise their identity in order to ferret out a story. Id. 
 235. William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 299 
(2004).  
 236. In Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003), the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the state’s power to police fraudulent claims. In that case, telemarketers made fundraising calls 
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example of the perfectly-constitutional prohibition of the production and sale of 
counterfeit Purple Hearts in Alvarez, counterfeit campaign speech is, at base, a 
fraud pursued for an ignoble goal of the sort the state regularly bans. 
Counterfeited campaign speech thwarts members of the public from discerning 
who to believe: the counterfeiter or the real candidate. As discussed in Part II, 
more speech cannot adequately cure the damage done.237 For these reasons, there 
is a strong argument that First Amendment protections do not reach counterfeit 
campaign speech. 
In the case of defamatory speech, the Court has blessed liability for 
malicious lies told about public figures. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the 
Supreme Court established that false speech about public figures, so long as 
actual malice and knowledge of falsity is proved, is not protected by the First 
Amendment.238 The Court weighed the right of the public to criticize public 
officials, including candidates for office, and found that the importance of 
uninhibited discourse about public events (including inadvertent mistruths) 
precluded public officials from pursuing libel judgments unless knowledge of 
falsity or reckless disregard of the truth could be shown.239 Sullivan thereby 
recognized that just because defamatory false speech is uttered in the political 
realm does not mean the First Amendment indelibly protects it. Defamatory false 
speech uttered with knowledge of falsity is not protected.240 Neither, in that same 
light, should the First Amendment protect counterfeit campaign speech.241 
 
claiming that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be used for charitable purposes. These claims 
were knowingly false. The lower court found that the First Amendment protected the speech at issue. The U.S. 
Supreme Court, however, focused on the fraudulent nature of the speech and held that the First Amendment did 
not bar prosecution. Id. at 624 (“Consistent with our precedent and the First Amendment, states may maintain 
fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how 
their donations will be used.”). See Jason Zenor, A Reckless Disregard for the Truth? The Constitutional Right 
to Lie in Politics, 38 CAMPBELL L. REV. 41, 63 (2016) (comparing false campaign speech to false advertising in 
the commercial realm). 
 237. Richard Hasen suggests that a law prohibiting lies by candidates that are easily verifiable might be 
constitutional. As soon as the question becomes murkier—for example, whether the candidate supports tax 
increases—the risk of prosecutorial discretion rises, a concern commonly raised by courts examining the 
question. But Hasen points to a problem in this logic: if false speech is easily verifiable as such, the counter-
speech cure is arguably the best means of addressing it. Hasen, supra note 14 at 75. In the case of counterfeit 
campaign speech, if the counterfeit is easily verified as false (ineptly done or obviously fake) the need for 
protection against it diminishes. If verification of authenticity is nearly if not entirely impossible, then counter 
speech is ineffective. 
 238. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (announcing “a federal rule that prohibits a public 
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves 
that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.”). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 281–82 (“[A]ny [public official] claiming to be defamed by the communication must show actual 
malice, or go remediless. This privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of public 
concern, public men, and candidates for office.” (citation omitted)). 
 241. Id. at 279–80 (“The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official 
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”). 
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Principal among the Sullivan Court’s concern was protecting robust and 
unfettered discourse and exchange of opinion about public figures—something 
it felt compelled to secure even when untruths inadvertently enter political 
discourse. Sullivan’s goal of protecting the marketplace—even that sullied by 
unknowing factual error and mistruths—is furthered by a ban of counterfeit 
campaign speech; it seeks to ensure that only “real” speech enters the 
marketplace. 
If Sullivan provides strong support for the assertion that a prohibition on 
counterfeit campaign speech could survive constitutional scrutiny, the conduct-
versus-speech dichotomy provides additional support. Laws that prohibit 
computer tampering,242 identity theft,243 and unauthorized impersonation,244 
target specific conduct can be constitutionally prohibited.245 It is illegal to hack 
into someone’s computer account. It is illegal to steal someone’s identity and 
take out a loan in her name. It is illegal to impersonate a police officer. The First 
Amendment does not stop prohibition of these forms of conduct.246 Doctoring a 
candidate’s speech bears a strong relation to constitutionally-punishable 
conduct.247  
One might counter that because counterfeit campaign speech occurs in the 
First Amendment sanctum of political discourse, it cannot so easily escape 
constitutional scrutiny. In the draft card case United States v. O’Brien, the Court 
advised that when core “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the 
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in 
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First 
Amendment freedoms.”248 Thus, even if counterfeit campaign speech is seen as 
a form of conduct, the analysis would come down to the strength of the 
government interest in preventing it. In Chappell, the government’s interest was 
protecting public safety;249 in O’Brien it was protecting the administrative 
functions of the draft system in wartime America.250 Is protecting voters, our 
system of elections, and candidates similarly vital? 
 
 242. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012) (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act). 
 243. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2000) (The Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act). 
 244. See, e.g., VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-174 (West 2018) (“Any person who falsely assumes or exercises the 
functions, powers, duties, and privileges incident to the office of sheriff, police officer, marshal, or other peace 
officer, or any local, city, county, state, or federal law-enforcement officer, or who falsely assumes or pretends 
to be any such officer, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”). 
 245. Justice Kennedy ceded in Alvarez that laws may “prohibit impersonating a Government officer” and 
punish impersonators even without a showing of “‘actual financial or property loss’ resulting from the 
deception.” United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721 (2012). 
 246. Id. at 720 (plurality opinion); id. at 734 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 746 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 247. This is the conclusion the Texas appeals court reached in Ex parte Maddison. In that case, the court 
found that “[i]mpersonation is a nature-of-conduct offense.” See Ex parte Maddison, 518 S.W.3d 630, 637 (Tex. 
App. 2017). 
 248. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 249. United States v. Chappell, 691 F.3d 388, 402 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 250. 391 U.S. at 381 (“We think it apparent that the continuing availability to each registrant of his Selective 
Service certificates substantially furthers the smooth and proper functioning of the system that Congress has 
established to raise armies. We think it also apparent that the Nation has a vital interest in having a system for 
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Even if a court were unwilling to exempt counterfeit campaign speech as a 
category unprotected under the First Amendment or as a constitutional conduct 
prohibition, a narrow law targeting counterfeited candidate speech produced and 
distributed with knowing intent to confuse voters and disrupt elections should 
survive First Amendment scrutiny because the harm it seeks to prevent is 
democratically existential. It provides the narrow exception the Alvarez court 
required: proof of specific harm to identifiable victims or specific harm by 
interference with the functioning of a government department.251 Here, harms to 
voters, our system of elections, and to candidates themselves satisfy the test. 
In sum, the First Amendment barrier to a ban is significant but 
surmountable. Part V next explores practical challenges to curbing counterfeit 
campaign speech. 
V. PRACTICAL HURDLES TO PROHIBITING COUNTERFEIT CAMPAIGN 
SPEECH 
Whether or not a restriction of counterfeit campaign speech survives 
constitutional scrutiny, practical challenges remain: counterfeit campaign 
speech is hard to detect and even when detected may not be prosecuted in time 
to prevent the identified harms.  
A. A PROBLEM OF DETECTION 
Given the current state of technology, counterfeit campaign speech can be 
very difficult to identify in three respects. First, on its face, a video, image, audio, 
or written form of counterfeit campaign speech appears real; that is the point. It 
may well take a long time (if ever) for a counterfeit to be exposed. Technology 
that readily detects fakes through digital forensics is not yet available.252 
Forensic computer scientist Hany Farid has devoted his career to authenticating 
digital material. Professor Farid warns that new and sophisticated technology 
thwarts digital forensic techniques through, 
[R]apid advances in machine learning that have made it easier than ever to create 
sophisticated and compelling fakes. These technologies have removed many of 
the time and skill barriers previously required to create high-quality fakes. Not 
only can these automatic tools be used to create compelling fakes, they can be 
turned against our forensic techniques . . . [to] modify fake content to bypass 
forensic detection.253 
 
raising armies that functions with maximum efficiency and is capable of easily and quickly responding to 
continually changing circumstances.”). 
 251. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 734 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 252. Hany Farid, Digital Forensics in a Post-Truth Age, 289 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 268, 268 (2018) 
(describing the process of authentication photographic material). 
 253. Id. 
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What Farid describes is a counterfeit-authentication arms race—and one in 
which counterfeiters are outrunning digital forensics experts’ ability to expose 
fakes.254 
Second, even if material can be reliably identified as fake, a legal 
prohibition might be difficult to enforce. Locating the person or entity that 
created and distributed the counterfeit is very often an impossible task.255 The 
nature of the modern information environment poses real risks in that 
perpetrators of crime online can easily hide.256 Not all purveyors of counterfeited 
candidate speech will be sophisticated actors capable of leveraging impenetrable 
online anonymity tools. But, particularly if such conduct is outlawed, those who 
engage in this form of fraud are likely to mask their identities with increasing 
sophistication. 
Third, a very real hurdle to any ban on counterfeited candidate speech is 
that even when identified, counterfeiters may not physically reside within U.S. 
jurisdiction. Prosecutions of foreign individuals for a growing list of crimes face 
similar challenges. And given the difficulties associated with prosecuting 
foreign nationals, a ban on counterfeit campaign speech’s value of deterrence 
diminishes. As Chesney and Citron describe: 
The prospect of a criminal prosecution in the United States will mean little to 
foreign government agents involved in [producing fakes] so long as they are not 
likely to end up in U.S. custody (thought it might mean something more to private 
actors through whom those agencies sometimes choose to act, at least if they 
intend to travel abroad).257 
Still, Robert Mueller’s indictment of Russian Nationals for, inter alia, 
assuming fake identities to create social media accounts suggests that 
international criminal prosecution to protect the sanctity of U.S. elections is not 
an entirely lost cause.258 
 
 254. See Warzel, supra note 10 (describing the phenomenon of “laser phishing” (i.e., faked phishing 
communications appearing to be from one’s close friends or family rather than a man from Nigeria) becoming 
a widespread inevitability. As one expert describes, “It’s a threat for sure, but even worse—I don’t think there’s 
a solution right now”). Facebook is attempting to use artificial intelligence to help detect deep fake videos. See 
Liam Tung, Facebook’s Fact-Checkers Train AI to Detect ‘Deep Fake’ Videos, ZDNET (Sept. 14, 2018), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebooks-fact-checkers-train-ai-to-detect-deep-fake-videos/. 
 255. As Chesney and Citron describe in addressing the challenges of deep fakes generally, “ascertaining 
provenance in connection with a deep fake might be insufficient to identify its creator.” Chesney and Citron, 
supra note 5 at 34. They note that this problem is exacerbated when “the creator or someone else posts the deep 
fake on social media or otherwise injects it into the marketplace of information.” Id. 
 256. See Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the Dark Web, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1090 (2017) (describing the related problem of the increasing difficulty of pursuing 
criminal suspects who have anonymized their identity on the dark web). 
 257. Chesney and Citron, supra note 5, at 44–45. 
 258. Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency, No. 1:18-cr-00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 
2018). 
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B. THE ELECTION-EVE PROBLEM 
In the realm of protecting elections, timing is often everything. If the goal 
is to protect the electoral process from faked candidate speech, could a ban 
provide an adequate remedy before the damage is done? Particularly with 
respect to counterfeit campaign speech unleashed on the eve of an election, a 
remedy may fail to protect the vote. Sophisticated actors will surely time the 
release of counterfeit campaign speech to maximize its damage to the candidate, 
to voters, and to the electoral process.259  
One way to address the unique timing problem counterfeit campaign 
speech presents is to implement a notice and take-down regime similar to the 
system used in copyright law but confined to a short period before an election.260 
This could provide candidates who become aware of counterfeited campaign 
speech a means to require the platform hosting it to remove it immediately from 
circulation followed by a process for determining liability that would unfold 
after its power to distort an electoral outcome is extinguished. The obvious retort 
is that any requirement to immediately remove political speech from circulation 
could be misused by political adversaries, resulting in a diminished marketplace 
of ideas.261 Those considering this type of tool to address counterfeit campaign 
speech must carefully balance these interests. 
Importantly, assuming digital forensics continue to improve, it may well 
be that, in the future, detecting faked speech quickly and effectively will be 
possible. One fascinating breakthrough came when media forensics experts 
realized that people portrayed in deep fake videos rarely blink, suggesting a 
surprising avenue of detection.262 For the most part, however, media forensic 
scientists are keeping possible detection methods under wraps for fear of tipping 
off deep fakers on ways to elude detection.263 Despite Hany Farid’s gloomy 
predictions, he and many others are on the job.264 One can imagine that a 
 
 259. This problem arises often in courts’ appraisals of the problem of deception in campaigns generally. 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1254 (Mass. 2015) (noting difficulty in discrediting a 
lie on eve of election); see also Chesney and Citron, supra note 5 at 20 (listing as a harm to society “fake audio 
clip that [sic] ‘reveal[s]’ criminal behavior by a candidate on the eve of an election.”). 
 260. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA) notice and take-down provisions codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 512(c)(3), (g)(2) (2012). Scholars have proposed modified notice-and-takedown regimes to address 
harms such as revenge porn. See, e.g., Ariel Ronneburger, Sex, Privacy, and Webpages: Creating a Legal 
Remedy for Victims of Porn 2.0, 2009 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 28–30; see also Derek E. 
Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2055 (2014) (“Internet intermediaries are familiar with analogous 
provisions of [the DCMA], which condition immunity on compliance with a notice-and-takedown system for 
material allegedly infringing copyright. It should be straightforward for Internet firms to implement the proposed 
notice-and-takedown system for non-consensual distribution of intimate media as well.”). 
 261. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 14 at 75 (noting the Court’s concern with “partisan manipulation” of 
processes to police lies in campaigns). 
 262. Will Knight, The Defense Department Has Produced the First Tools for Catching Deepfakes, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611726/the-defense-department-has-
produced-the-first-tools-for-catching-deepfakes/.  
 263. Id. (explaining that scientists would “rather hold off at least for a little bit . . . . We have a little 
advantage over the forgers right now, and we want to keep that advantage.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 264. Farid, supra note 252.  
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technological fix may one day eclipse legal prohibition, allowing voters and/or 
trusted platforms to filter content to ensure that faked candidate speech does not 
reach voters’ eyes and ears—or that, if it does, it is clearly identified as such.265 
Some might object to detection filters of any kind. Surely a filter would be 
imperfect, acting as a technological censor of speech that could be authentic and 
important. Yet, it is a good placeholder; workable technological solutions to the 
problem of counterfeit campaign speech may lie somewhere on the horizon. In 
the meantime, a clear law imposing stiff penalties would serve as a deterrent, as 
would well-publicized prosecutions even after elections have concluded. 
CONCLUSION 
A ban on counterfeit campaign speech is a natural extension of age-old 
bans on counterfeit activity that seeks to defraud. Seen in this light, counterfeit 
campaign speech could serve as the unicorn courts and scholars have suggested 
exists to reign in at least one form of false election speech. Stemming the tide of 
counterfeited candidate speech—or perhaps more achievably ensuring that it is 
labeled as such—is no easy task. But some of the hardest problems of regulating 
false campaign speech fall away when the targeted behavior is counterfeited 
candidate speech. This narrow focus does not eliminate line-drawing problems, 
nor ought it remove all First Amendment scrutiny given the core nature of 
political speech involved. Still, to safeguard the faith of the voting public, to 
preserve the essence of our democratic project, and to protect the ever-dwindling 
dignity of candidates for office, attention to what can be done deserves every 
effort. As argued here, recognizing that a ban on counterfeit campaign speech is 
constitutionally permissible—and advisable—is a step in that direction.  
  
 
 265. See, e.g., Hany Farid, Reining in Online Abuses, 19 TECH. AND INNOVATION 593, 594 (2018) 
(describing efforts to develop technologies to detect child pornography images). 
